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1.0 Study Outline 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The Marine Stewardship Council eco-labelling scheme was formed in order to provide a means of 
promoting sustainable fisheries that moved away from conventional top-down management.  In order 
to remain robust and transparent, MSC allows stakeholders to object to a certification through an 
objections process outlined by MSC.  Over the past 15 years, this objections process has come under 
increasing scrutiny.  The MSC OP has been accused of Ambiguous wording, principal agent issues 
and an unequal judicial process by some stakeholders and outside commentators.  These accusations 
pose a real threat to the reputation of the MSC.   If left un-addressed, MSC’s credibility amongst 
consumers and academics has the potential to be lost.  This thesis seeks to investigate the legitimacy 
and robustness of the MSC OP.  There is a focus on the way in which the MSC OP facilitates 
interactions between objection actors, influences actors, and how each actor is empowered by the 
MSC OP methodology.   
 
The past twenty years has seen a rapid acceleration in the degradation of world fisheries (Ward & 
Phillips, 2008).  Ineffective policy and management strategies have resulted in excessive and illegal 
catch, destructive fishing practices and perverse economic incentives. These impacts have primarily 
contributed to what is currently a concerning state in world fisheries (Mullon et al, 2005; Bensch et al, 
2008). The FAO estimates that 80% of world fish stocks are either fully exploited, overexploited or 
have collapsed (Mora et al, 2009) and there is concern that many of fisheries that are listed as fully 
fished (52%) are simply transitioning to an overfished status (Ward & Phillips, 2008).  One author 
even suggests that the global collapse of all taxa currently fished may occur by the year 2048 (Worm 
et al, 2006). 
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Sighting the shortcomings of traditional, top-down, fisheries management strategies (such as 
command and control, tradable quota and voluntary systems) several authors have focussed their 
attention towards the consumer end of the market to provide a new means of sustainably managing 
fisheries (Espach, 2006; Gulbrandsen 2005; Tiesl 2008).  The idea sought to capitalise on the primary 
goal of producers which is to obtain a greater market share for their product (Mason, 2008; 
Gulbrandsen, 2006).  For this to occur, it is essential producers positively influence consumer 
preference.  It was thought that if consumer preference required producers to fish sustainably, then 
fishers would be incentivised to do so in order to remain competitive (Durst et al, 2006).  The concept 
of eco-labelling emerged from these discussions.  An eco-label is a certification label placed on a 
product, communicating to the consumer that the product has met certain sustainability criteria during 
its production as defined by the eco-labelling organization (Gullastigue 2002; Mason 2008).  By 
communicating such information, consumers are provided with the means to make sustainably 
responsible purchasing choices. 
 
The most widely utilized eco-label in global seafood trade is that of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC).  Established in 1996 by the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) and Unilever (a major 
international exporter of seafood), MSC sought to create a global system of sustainable fisheries that 
will “provide powerful economic incentives for sustainable well-managed fishing” (WWF, 1996a) 
and thereby “halt a catastrophic decline in the world’s fish stocks by harnessing consumer power” 
(ANP, 1996). 
 
The MSC looked to build on the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 
1995a), the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (FAO, 1995b), and resulted in further international fisheries 
agreements being developed through an inclusive consultation process between 1996 and 1999 (Anon, 
2003).  
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Three primary principles for sustainable fishing were agreed upon with which certified producers 
would need to comply.  These are:  
 
1. A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion of the 
exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted; the fishery must be 
conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery. 
 
2. Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, function 
and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated and dependent and 
ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends. 
 
 
3. The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, national and 
international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational frameworks 
that require use of the resource to be responsible and sustainable. 
 
Although MSC’s effectiveness is debated (Gulbrandsen, 2008), the number of MSC certified fisheries 
has accelerated to 139 globally and is rapidly expanding as fishers perceive the benefits of 
certification (www.msc.org/track-a-fishery/certified. 06/03/2012).  
 
It is recognised that an effective eco-label must maintain a high degree of transparency, 
trustworthiness and reliability amongst consumers (Gallastigue, 2002; Tiesl et al, 2008). MSC seeks 
to maintain these qualities through a transparent certification process, involving stakeholders, 
pursuing independent assessment and making available information regarding a fisheries assessment 
for certification online for the public to judge.  
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The second method (and focus of this research) in which MSC seeks to maintain these qualities is 
through the use of an independent Objections Procedure (OP) (MSC, 2009). This allows a stakeholder 
to formally object to the certification of a fishery should they disagree with its certification.  By 
employing the use of an OP, MSC increases its transparency and reliability; allowing stakeholders to 
scrutinize aspects of a MSC certification thought to require further justification.  An objection can be 
based on three categories of discontent: 
 
1. The objection identifies a serious procedural or other irregularity in the assessment process 
that made a material difference to the fairness of the assessment;  
 
2. The score given for one or more performance indicators cannot be satisfactorily justified by 
the CB due to factual errors, omission of relevant information or arbitrariness;  
 
3. Additional information has been identified that is relevant to the assessment by the date of 
Determination
1
 and was not available or known to the CB
2
. 
 
(MSC, 2009) 
 
The purpose of the OP is to “provide an orderly, structured, transparent and independent process by 
which objections to the Final Report and Determination of a Certifier can be resolved. It is not the 
purpose of the Objections Procedure to review the subject fishery against the MSC Principles and 
Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries, but to determine whether the CB made an error that materially 
affected the outcome of its Determination” (MSC, 2010d: 2). 
 
                                                          
1
 The Determination refers to the Final Determination report written by the CB (see below) post assessment.  
This report confirms or rejects MSC certification of the fishery in assessment. 
2
 A certifier refers to the company tasked with assessing the sustainability of a fishery on behalf of MSC.  The 
certifier is often referred to as the Certification Body. 
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In order for the OP to support transparency and reliability in MSC, it is critical that the OP itself 
produces legitimate outcomes that address the concerns raised by the OB.  However, during the 
eleven years MSC has been in operation, issues surrounding the legitimacy of contentious 
certifications and the robustness of the OP have been raised by several authors and environmental 
agencies (Highleyman, 2004; Forest & Bird, 2007; Ponte, 2006; Pope, 2010).   
 
Of the thirteen objections that have proceeded to adjudication
3
, only one has been upheld, three still 
being in assessment.  These objections included the highly contentious Antarctic Toothfish, New 
Zealand Hoki, Bearing Sea and Aleutian Island Pollock, and Antarctic Krill fisheries.  Resultant of 
historic objections, accusations regarding the legitimacy of the OP and its outcomes have begun to 
emerge.  Several examples follow. 
 
Highleyman (2004) accuses the MSC of giving the Certification Body (CB) too much responsibility 
in defining the scoring criteria of a fishery during assessment and contends that “MSC’s claim of 
certifying sustainable fisheries in most cases is not justified under the definition established by its 
standards” (Highleyman, 2004; Pg. i).  It is said that this enables the CB to justify their position in 
almost all circumstances.   
 
After being involved in the 2007 New Zealand Hoki objection, Forest & Bird New Zealand accuse 
MSC of being “fatally flawed” and sending “the wrong message to fishing companies world wide” 
(sic) (Forest & Bird, 2007).  There were instances during the Hoki objection where an independent 
panel of fisheries experts found “some validity to the Objectorss’ position that this is not a fishery 
that should be certified as sustainable” (Forest & Bird, 2007).  However, due to the “procedures (the 
                                                          
3
 The formal objection phase of an MSC objection. See chapter 5.5 
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OP) the Panel was operating under they were unable to stop the fishery being certified as 
“sustainable” (Forest & Bird, 2007).   
 
In the case of the 2009 Antarctic Krill objection filed by the Antarctic Southern Ocean Coalition 
(ASOC), the Independent Adjudicator
4
 (IA) identified a “serious procedural error” by the CB Moody 
Marine, however approved certification (ASOC, 2010).  ASOC have accused the IA of ignoring its 
concerns during the objection regarding climate change impacts, biological uncertainties and the 
impact of fishing on the marine food web (ASOC, 2010).   
 
The Yukon River Drainage Fisheries Association (YDRFA) objected in 2010 to the MSC certification 
of Alaskan Pollock, estimated to be worth nearly $1 billion a year (MSC, 2010L). The YDRFA 
highlight that populations appear to have halved since 2004, with 2009 quotas being cut by nearly 20 
per cent (Pope, 2010). The objection was however turned down.  In this instance, it was accused that 
the financial gains of unsustainable fishing influenced the IA’s decision.  Jeremy Jackson, of Scripps 
Institution of Oceanography in San Diego, California, said: “Economic pressures to keep on fishing at 
such high levels have overwhelmed common sense” (Pope, 2010: 1). 
 
Additionally, some authors have cited ambiguous wordings such as “reasonable", "adequately 
identified" and "appropriate consultative process" in MSC doctrine as empowering CBs to dispel 
condemnation (Peacey, 2000; Jaquet & Pauly, 2008). 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Independent expert assigned by MSC to adjudicate an Objection See Objections Overview. See chapter 5.5 
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Because there have only been thirteen objections that have proceeded to adjudication, there is good 
opportunity to study the experiences of objection participants.  Additionally, because the MSC is 
fairly young as an organization (14years), research into the OP may provide insights into the 
emerging effectiveness of MSC as an eco-label. 
 
This study employs a questionnaire based, qualitative research design in order to extract the views and 
perspectives of those involved in historical MSC objections.  Additionally, official MSC objections 
documentation was used to help illustrate, provide insight and add perspective to the views of the 
questionnaire respondents.  The views of individuals from all participating groups in an objection 
were sought and their responses analysed using Grounded Theory (GT).   
 
 1.2 Contribution of this research 
A study focussing on the MSC OP has, to the knowledge of the author, never been conducted in the 
academic literature.  It is hoped that this research will help shed light onto issues of process and 
credibility within the MSC OP in order to validate or dispel concerns, identify potential areas for 
improvement and encourage discussion regarding the structure and operation of the MSC Objections 
Procedure. 
 
1.3 Aim of the study 
The aim of this study was to examine the Objections Procedure of the Marine Stewardship 
Council’s eco-labelling programme (MSC, 2009).  Specifically the research focussed on how 
the structure and institutions of the MSC Objections Procedure has contributed to the 
outcome of historic objections, how the procedure has empowered different actors during the 
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Objections Procedure and whether the Objections Procedure results in outcomes that support 
MSC’s fundamental principles (MSC, 2010). 
 
1.4 Research question & Objectives 
This thesis aimed to examine the following research questions and objectives in pursuit of 
achieving the overarching aim of the study: 
1. How does the Marine Stewardship Council’s Objections Procedure operate and 
how does it facilitate interactions between actors? 
2. How does the Marine Stewardship Council’s Objections Procedure contribute to an 
objections final decision and measures taken during after an objection? 
3. To what extent does the Marine Stewardship Council’s Objections Procedure lead 
to outcomes supporting the MSC’s principles? 
 
Research objectives used to answer the above questions were defined as follows: 
Objective 1: Construct a conceptual framework for the research in which the role of the 
Marine Stewardship Council is placed in the context of global fisheries management 
methods. This is in order to identify the general forces within the MSC Objections Procedure 
and understand its overall function. In accordance with the thesis requirements, this will be in 
the form of a literature review. 
 
Objective 2: Gather documentation providing an account of how each MSC objection has 
played out in order to gain an understanding of the recorded interactions between the actors. 
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Objective 3: Acquire the opinions of different groups and individuals who have been 
involved in one or more MSC objections in order to gain their perspective and understanding 
of the MSC Objections Procedure. 
 
Objective 4: Analyse questionnaire data using GT, placing the emergent themes in the 
context of institutional theory and MSC Objections Procedure protocol.  This will inform the 
researcher of any common themes that have arisen through the different MSC objections, 
providing a real world context, and give insight into areas of contention amongst actors. 
 
Objective 5:  
A. Assess how the MSC Objections Procedure facilitates and empowers the actions 
between actors; 
B. Using the conclusions of 5A, determine the extent to which the Objections 
Procedure leads to outcomes supporting MSC’s fundamental principles. 
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2.0 Methodology 
2.1 Methodological Approach: General State of Inquiry 
2.1.1 Research Paradigm 
 
As an academic researcher, it is important to be clear of one’s paradigm and the values held.  
It is therefore important to recognise the inevitable values associated with all research inquiry 
and attempting to minimize the incursions these values have on the research (Babcock, 1980). 
 
There are two elements to this research’s paradigm. The first accepts that the MSC OP is 
formed by and carried out within a framework defined by MSC (MSC, 2009).  The MSC OP 
methodology provides a framework in which people and institutions may interact during an 
objection, shaping the behaviour of actors to a set of values and institutions within the 
objections methodology, as defined by MSC (MSC, 2010d).   
 
The second element takes into account the postpositivistic and social constructivist nature of 
institutions and their interactions.  This draws upon Kiser and Ostrom’s (1982) “rational 
institutionalism” model which acknowledges that “an individual’s perception of the world is 
influenced by a set of internally-generated motivations, and externally-generated world 
views, guides and rules instilled by the institutions in which people reside”.   
 
‘Institutions’ represent the conventions, norms and formally defined rules of society.  These 
can include families, places of work, educational institutions, economic institutions, culture 
and groups (Scott, 1987; Vatn, 2005).  
18 
 
In this research, the primary institutions are defined by the Marine Stewardship Council as 
the overarching organization within which the MSC OP operates. The principles and criteria 
of MSC operation, assessment methodologies and procedures each represent institutions 
within MSC. 
 
The actors which operate within the MSC institutions during an objection are the 
Certification Bodies, environmental organizations and non-governmental organizations, 
fishery stakeholder groups and the Fishery FC (FC) (fishing company/industry seeking 
certification of fisheries) and Independent Adjudicator.   
 
The behaviour and actions of the actors in this context is said to be the result of a complex 
web of dynamic forces that have negative and positive feedbacks and power to significantly 
alter the course of institutions (Butler, 2011).  Therefore it is relevant to study the 
relationships and drivers between actors in order to gain an understanding of how the MSC 
Objections Procedure operates.   
 
The array of interactions that occur during an objection renders a reductionist or positivist 
approach to this research inappropriate.  This is because the forces driving the actions and 
reactions of actors during an objection cannot always be confined to a single source.  The 
motivation for any action taken by one actor has potentially many origins.  Because of 
potential underlying motivations (e.g. principal-agent incentives) of any actor, this research 
must allow for any unseen rationales and influences during an objection to emerge in order to 
gain a full description of the interactions between actors during an objection. Thus, the MSC 
OP cannot be reduced to any of its independent parts or to any of the (reducible) relations between 
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the parts.  This type of research therefore demands a study that is holistic and contextual 
(Silberstein & McGeever, 1999; Brockman, 2006).  
 
The difficulty in interpreting what might influence someone’s view of a phenomenon (e.g. an 
event or process) makes it important that the researcher reduces the level to which they 
impose his/her ideas upon the data (Porter & van der Linde, 1995). Research using this type 
of data requires that the data is allowed to ‘speak’ and reveal emergent features within the 
studied process without being manipulated by the researcher’s conscious or subconscious 
biases.  Therefore, this research decided that an inductive, postpositivist approach using 
qualitative research techniques (Flick, 2009) is most appropriate in the case of this study.   
 
Because of the limited scope of this thesis, a case study design will be used, requiring ‘key’ 
informants to answer set questions.  Whilst this approach limits the replicability and 
reliability of this study, it is hoped that the insights attained from the flexible and holistic 
approach of inductive inquiry will give great scope for further application. 
 
2.1.2 Research design 
 
There are two major approaches to qualitative research analysis evident in the literature: 
analytic induction and GT (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  Analytic induction is unsuitable for this 
research as it requires an initial hypothesis.   
 
It is acknowledged that theories such as market failure and principal-agency theory (see 
literature review) are utilized in this research; however these do not form the basis of a 
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hypothesis.  These theories merely assist in helping to contextualize data and themes 
produced where applicable. 
 
GT varies from the customary model of research, where the researcher chooses a theoretical 
framework, and only then applies this model to the phenomenon to be studied (Allan, 2003). I 
have no previous, primary data to base an initial hypothesis on and to continually re-
hypothesize as data is analysed would be inefficient and impose time costs greater than a 90 
point thesis will allow.  In the light of this, GT will be employed to allow the data to 
demonstrate phenomena via a continual revision of categories and theories (Glaser 2002, 
Charmaz 2000).  There are several ways in which GT can be used (McCreaddie & Payne, 
2010); however in this study, GT will be used to illustrate the interconnections and reflexivity 
between actors during an MSC objection.  Emergent features in the data will be used to paint 
a picture of the forces acting on individuals and bodies during an objection to help ascertain 
how the MSC objections methodology influences the final objection outcome. 
 
Data sources 
As part of the MSC “vision & mission” statements, MSC aims to be transparent with 
stakeholders and the public regarding all facets of its operation (www.msc.org/about-
us/vision-mission, 2011).  This has resulted in MSC making public all official documentation 
and correspondence between actors during the certification and Objections Procedure 
available via their website www.msc.org.  This archive provides a rich record of information 
regarding the interplay between actors during each MSC objection.  Some records however 
have been removed from the MSC website but were made available following an email 
request to MSC. Although both the Hoki objections material and Antarctic Krill material 
provided was largely incomplete. 
21 
 
 
The MSC documentation was supplemented with questionnaire data to help elaborate on the 
intricacies of the MSC objection interplay and to gain insight into the reasoning behind each 
actor’s actions before, during and in response to an objection. 
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2.3 Research Process 
2.3.1 Objective 1: Literature Review 
 
The literature review section provides a real world context for this research and a survey of 
relevant theory. It outlines the state of world fisheries, predominant management strategies 
used in modern fisheries, and the different forces at play in fisheries management common in 
the modern developed world. This is followed by a section outlining the development of the 
eco-labelling concept and its theoretical purpose. Three examples of established eco-labels 
are also described. 
 
There is a strong theoretical basis in the review which provides insight into the different, 
institutional forces, incentives and mechanisms involved in eco-labelling and fisheries 
management.  The theoretical areas explored centre around the economic management of a 
common pool resource, governmental, private and voluntary management strategies, the 
principal-agent relationships between fishing bodies, market failures (and attempts to correct 
them), and how eco-labelling has been proposed to address issues that have been historically 
difficult to solve. The material for this is derived primarily from academic articles, opinion 
papers, books and journals.  
 
Subsequent of the review, a chapter describing MSC’s development and implementation, the 
certification and assessment process and the MSC Objections Procedure is provided.  This is 
further followed by a critique of the Objections Procedure, providing additional context for 
this research. 
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2.3.2 Objective 2: Data collection of documentation 
 
Documentation recording the events and correspondence between actors for each MSC 
objection was downloaded off the MSC website www.msc.org. Documentation from the 
2001 New Zealand Hoki and 2010 Alaskan Pollock objections were not available online but 
were provided by MSC following an email request, however these were incomplete. 
 
2.3.3 Objective 3: Data collection of opinions 
 
Detailed questionnaires were chosen above other data gathering methods because of their 
ability to be mailed electronically to overseas participants.  Interviewing and Skype was seen 
to be unacceptably time consuming and inconvenient for the researcher and participants. 
Questionnaires also provide a set group of questions, allowing for consistent comparison of 
answers regarding specific topic areas (Powell & Renner, 2003).  The questions were 
designed to extract information regarding personal and corporate experience with the MSC 
OP, whilst allowing the participant(s) to have the liberty to expand on points and opinions.   
 
The aim was to extract the participant’s opinions and experiences regarding elements of the 
MSC OP whilst granting a liberty to expand and provide insight into these. By doing so it 
was hoped the participants’ answers would not be narrowly constrained in their scope.  This 
approach to GT is more in line with Strauss & Corbin’s (1990) approach as opposed to 
Glaser’s (1992) approach.  As Tandon Bhal & Leekha (2008) explain; Glaser (1992) believes 
in identification and specification of the research issues entirely upon the perception of the 
participant. In Strauss & Corbin’s (1990) approach, the researcher has the flexibility to 
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choose the focus of the interviews around an area in advance, and data is gathered on that 
area.   
 
A “key informant” approach (also known as “purposeful sampling” (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990b) was taken when identifying participants.  To be labelled with “key” status the 
participant must have been closely involved in an MSC objection and be familiar with the 
happenings of the Objections Procedure in their case.  Informants were identified via the 
MSC objections correspondence available on MSC’s website and through personal 
correspondence with individuals and organizations that have participated in an MSC 
objection.  Questionnaires were designed for four participant types: OB, FC, CB and IA.  
With the exception of the IAs, participants were generally found to be part of an 
NGO/environmental group, government, company or MSC. In some cases, identified 
individuals were able to suggest more suitable candidates for the study. Once participants 
were identified they were contacted by phone or email to explain the research topic and gain 
their participation in the study.  
 
In accordance with Victoria University’s Human Ethics Committee (HEC) requirements, 
participants were provided an information sheet (appendix 3) outlining the research, and 
asked to sign a consent form outlining the HEC conditions of participation and the 
researchers responsibilities (appendix 4). A summary of the questionnaire requests and 
responses can be found below: 
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Participant 
Type 
No. Questionnaires 
Sent 
No. 
Questionnaires 
Replied 
Reasons Given for Refused 
Participation 
Independent 
Adjudicator 
6 0 IA's felt compelled to not 
participate due to the "quasi-
judicial" nature of their role. 
Certification 
Body (One copy 
was sent to 
each CB where 
contact details 
were available) 
8 3 Most certification bodies were 
apprehensive to participate due to 
their relationship with MSC.  Some 
refused contact information or to 
forward the questionnaire. Others 
failed to reply. 
Objecting Body 10 6 Too busy. Some did not reply. 
Fishery FC 2 1 Too busy to participate. 
Total 26 10  
Table 1. Summary of questionnaire participation for each participant type 
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2.3.4 Questionnaires 
 
Questionnaires were designed to present a structured set of questions that would produce 
answers around defined themes.   (See Appendix 2a-d for questionnaire templates).  These 
themes included: 
 
CB, FC & OB 
 
 Which MSC objection the participant had been involved with and briefly why they were 
objecting (if the OB). 
 Overall objections experience. 
 Level of satisfaction that concerns raised were appropriately addressed by the opposing 
party 
 Level of input and consideration of evidence by the IA 
 Satisfaction with weighting given to evidence and arguments by the IA. 
 Level of satisfaction regarding the weighting given to evidence and arguments from 
other parties by the IA 
 Level of satisfaction regarding the role of the IA 
 The financial burden of an objection 
 Possible improvements 
 Fulfilment of MSC principles 
IA 
 Satisfaction with role parameters 
 Satisfaction with objections process 
 Ability to weight evidence in a fair and transparent manner 
 Strengths/limitations of the MSC OP 
 Possible improvements 
 
27 
 
The questions were adapted for each participant type but aimed to get the participant to 
elaborate on the defined theme to provide any convergence or contrast in opinion. 
 
Questions regarding satisfaction during the MSC Objections Procedure were primarily in a 
Likert Scale (See Wuensch, 2005) formation, but with an additional option to expand on ones 
answer in subsequent questions. 
 
2.3.5 Objective 4: Data analysis 
Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is focussed primarily on collecting and analysing non-numeric data with 
the goal of achieving information depth rather than breadth (Baxter et al, 2001; Coleman & 
O’Connor, 2007). While quantitative research is more occupied with questions such as, how 
much? how many? how often, qualitative research is linked with questions such as; why? 
how? and in what way? Additionally, where quantitative research often operates in a 
deductive way, qualitative research frequently operates in an inductive way (Coleman & 
O’Connor, 2007). A deductive process is initiated by existing theory and uses this to 
formulate some hypotheses, and through testing these hypotheses tests the theory itself. In 
contrast, inductive research attempts to gather explanation and meaning through the 
collection and analysis of empirical data. Saunders et al (1996) defines this notion by stating; 
‘Where you commence your research project from a deductive position, you will seek to use 
existing theory to shape the approach which you adopt to the qualitative research process 
and to aspects of data analysis. On the other hand, where you commence your research 
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project from an inductive position, you will seek to build up a theory which is adequately 
grounded in a number of relevant cases’. Likewise, inductive research can also contribute an 
important role in the hypotheses generation (Fitzgerald, 1998). 
 
Whilst this thesis uses the above type of GT analysis, it is must be acknowledged that is 
concurrently uses existing theory to explore institutions, incentives and principal-agent 
relationships.  Without GT, the application of existing theories to the MSC OP would be 
based merely on speculation.  GT data is required to confirm or deny existing theory and has 
the potential to create new theory. 
 
Grounded Theory 
GT seeks to take an area of study, and allow the interlinkages and constructs of them to 
emerge from that study area (Corbin & Strauss, 1990; Tandon Bhal & Leekha, 2008). It is an 
inductive approach wherein theory is generated from the data itself. According to Strauss & 
Corbin (1998), the theory derived from GT data is more likely to resemble what is actually going on 
than if it were assembled from putting together a series of concepts based on experience or through 
speculation. 
 
As previously mentioned, there have been two approaches to GT. Glaser’s (1992) approach 
believes in identifying and specifying the research issues based upon the perception of the 
participant. In Corbin & Strauss’s (1990) approach, the researcher has more flexibility to 
choose the focus of the interviews (and other forms of qualitative data gathering) around an 
area in advance. This research has uses a purposeful sampling method; hence Corbin & 
Strauss’s approach has been followed.  
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Extracting theories and patterns from qualitative data is a multi-step process. As Corbin & 
Strauss (1990: pg. 7) state, ‘‘Theories can’t be built with actual incidents or activities as 
observed or reported; i.e., from ‘‘raw data.’’ The incidents, events, happenings are taken as, 
or analyzed as, potential indicators of phenomena, which are thereby given conceptual 
labels.’’ Identifying theory from data using GT involves coding the data at different levels of 
analysis. ‘‘Coding represents the operation by which data are broken down, conceptualized 
and put back together in new ways’’ (Corbin & Strauss, 1990: pg. 57).  
 
In agreement with GT (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), questionnaire responses were coded at 
increasing levels of analysis.  
Coding is defined by three distinct ‘steps’ or ‘phases’.  These are “open coding, “axial 
coding” and “selective coding”.  These are described below. 
 
Open Coding 
Open coding involves "breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and 
categorizing (qualitative) data" (Corbin & Strauss, 1990: 61) into categories or “codes”.  
“Codes” or “labels” refer to a “phenomenon” (that is, a problem, an issue, an event, or a 
happening) that is identified as significant by the respondents” (Corbin & Strauss, 1998: 
124).  These phenomena are identified in the respondent’s questionnaire transcript and 
assigned a corresponding code for identification. 
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The following are examples of open codes:  
  Insufficient justification of score (IJS) 
  Principal agent issues (PAI) 
  Unsatisfied with IA role (UIAR)  
 
Each was assigned a numerical identification and written beside corresponding lines on the 
questionnaire transcripts.  This facilitated the iterative process required by GT.  
 
Axial Coding 
The second phase to GT, Axial coding, is the “process of relating categories to their 
subcategories, termed “axial” because coding occurs around the axis of a category, linking 
categories at the level of properties and dimensions” (Corbin & Strauss 1998: 123). 
 
During axial coding, subcategories are associated with their corresponding properties and 
dimensions (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  Axial coding focuses on how categories intersect and 
link.  Rather than representing the phenomenon itself, a subcategory answers questions about 
the phenomenon (such as: when? Where? Why? What? Who? And how?), in turn generating 
greater explanatory power (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) 
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Examples from this thesis of open codes and their corresponding axial code include: 
 
Open Code Axial Code 
Unsatisfied with IA role (UIAR) Due to Questionable independence of IA 
(UIAR – IAQ) 
 
Insufficient justification of score (IJS) Inadequate management (IJS - IM) 
Principal agent issues (PAI) CB financed by the FC 
(PAI – CBFFC) 
 
Selective Coding 
Selective coding is defined by Strauss & Corbin (1998: 143) as “the process of integrating 
and refining the theory”, the term “theory” referring to the current, interpreted state of the 
data.  Selective coding involves integrating and refining categories identified in open and 
axial coding.  During selective coding, ‘core categories’ are identified through a process of 
refinement and a ‘story’ or comparison is constructed around this.  Essentially the codes 
identified in open and axial coding are refined until there can be no further refinement.  These 
core themes are used to identify relationships, trends, causal links and emergent features in 
the data which allows the researcher to form a basis for theory, or reverse engineered 
hypothesis (Allan, 2003). 
 
The use of GT in this Research 
The use of GT when analysing the questionnaire responses in this study was largely successful.  
Common themes amongst and between actors were identified and there was good contrast and 
convergence in themes and opinion expressed.  Because the questionnaire questions were related to 
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similar topics for each actor, the underlying causal links and emergent features of the data provided 
for interesting analysis.  Additionally, the application of existing theories (e.g. principal-agent theory) 
to the GT data allowed for the confirmation or rejection of these theories in the MSC OP, and 
suggested additional theory development. 
 
 
2.4 Limitations 
2.4.1 Limitations of Grounded Theory in this Study 
 
It is impossible for a researcher to undertake a project with a “clean” mental state; devoid of 
preconceived notions and ideology regarding what may emerge from the type of data GT 
provides (Malterud, 2001).  GT attempts to let the ‘data do the talking’ by systematically 
analyzing themes in the data and allowing theories to emerge from them (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990).  However, the obligation to develop a theoretically informed and a well-constructed 
research question for a thesis demands a certain amount of preconception by the researcher.  
Having some initial preconception is however not entirely disregarded. Bailey (2007: Pg. 
127) points out that themes and theories do not emerge from the data “like daffodils” but 
rather are drawn out by the researcher. Funder (2005) argues that the manner in which these 
themes are extracted will depend in part on the researcher’s institutional experience.  
Therefore it is almost impossible to avoid some sort of preconceived interpretation of GT 
data as one never approaches the research with a ‘clean slate’. 
 
GT itself, and in the context of this research, harbours potential issues that may limit the 
results of this study.  When sampling in GT, one questions successive participants until 
essentially no new data is emerging from the questions (Cutcliffe, 2000).  This research 
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project is limited to the number of MSC objection participants who made themselves 
available for questioning.  Each study group contains several individuals who could 
potentially partake in the study; thus limiting the number of potential participants to the 
number of MSC objections filed.  Additionally, participant numbers are constrained further 
by the availability and usefulness of the participant.  Therefore, any themes or theories 
derived from the data will reflect those who have been recorded to date.  Because of the 
limited pool of participants available and those who chose not to participate, there is room for 
bias in the information received.  Because participants who take part in the study are only 
those who agree to participate, the willingness or lack thereof will bias results, particularly 
where participants feel a sense of injustice or have strong opinions.   
Additionally, GT begins with the researcher having no evolving theory to act as a guide in 
theoretical sampling of data.  Baker et al (1992) maintain that the researcher using GT 
initiates the sampling process by interviewing “significant” individuals, those who have good 
experience in the topical area.   Where there is a limited amount of respondents, the 
information provided will be limited in its scope to the experience of participating individuals 
and potentially not cover every possible theme to saturation. 
 
The final significant limitation to this research surrounds the use of a literature review.  
Strauss & Corbin (1994) recommend that researchers do not conduct a literature review prior 
to data analysis.  By avoiding a literature review initially, it is more likely that the emergent 
hypotheses or theory will be grounded in the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). However Smith 
& Bailey (1997: 20) acknowledge that general reading of the literature may be carried out 
prior to data collection in order to obtain a feel for the issues at work.  The demands of a 
thesis however require that a literature review be carried out to place the proposed research in 
the context of the wider literature.   
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2.4.2 Limitations of this Study 
 
The small sample size of twenty six participants is primarily due to the subjective nature of 
this study; however it also allows for qualitative richness.  As previously noted, the pool of 
potential participants is limited at the upper bound to the number of MSC objections filed (13 
as of 31/02/2012).  Because GT requires knowledgeable participants to supply data, this was 
unavoidable. 
 
Participant numbers were further constrained by refusals to participate.  In total, 16 of 26 
individuals approached refused to participate or simply could not allocate the time to 
complete the questionnaire (Table 1).  Of the four participant types, only the OBs (n= 6), the 
CB’s (n=3) and FC (n=1) completed the questionnaires.  Five of the six IAs felt that 
participation would undermine their role with the MSC, despite anonymity, and most FCs did 
not have the time to complete the questionnaire and were particularly difficult to find contacts 
for.  This limits the perspectives provided in the study to nine participants, and three 
participant types (OBs, CB and FC).   
 
The participant types represent opposing sides to an objection and provide some indication of 
the opinions held by either side.  Because OBs were more forthcoming in their participation, 
there is a danger of framing bias where the often critical tone of OBs can be allowed to direct 
the data analysis path.  The limited FC and CB participation restricts the scope and detail of 
opposing points of view.   
 
The relationship between the FC, Certification Bodies and MSC appeared to cause them to be 
more unwilling to participate in the study, despite assured anonymity. This was unfortunate, 
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and limited the FC and CBs points of view to a few individuals, leaving a narrow sample of 
the overall opinion pool of such groups. 
 
Additionally, without the IAs input there is a limited ability to discuss the role the 
Adjudicator plays during an objection or place the opinions of other respondents in the 
context of the Adjudicators abilities.  The definition and limitations of the IAs role are made 
available by MSC, along with records of action taken by the Adjudicator during each 
objection; however a lack of participation in the questionnaires confines the data to recorded 
behaviour, not personal perspective. 
 
Because the nature of the research involves individuals and organizations who have 
challenged one another’s points of view in regards to MSC certification, there is potential for 
participants to express their distaste for other parties by taking a more aggressive approach 
when given the opportunity to comment on them.  This may exaggerate some responses, 
distorting their recorded perspective from actual truths.  
 
The themes and perspectives identified in this study may have been influenced by the 
author’s area of study.  Several of the questionnaire respondents belong to and represent 
various NGO’s and environmental groups.  Additionally, as the author of this study is 
grounded in the area of environmental science, there is potential scope for the unconscious 
influencing of data analysis.  
 
The conclusions of this study will address a topic area that has received little academic focus, 
despite being controversial in the eyes of some individuals and groups.  It is hoped that this 
study will identify any shortcomings in the MSC Objections Procedure and recommend 
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changes that will move the MSC in a positive direction.  Even if ignored by MSC and other 
readers, the issue of a how privately designed and run objections systems remain objective is 
becoming increasingly relevant.  Hopefully this research can direct attention to this area in 
the academic realm. 
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3.0 Literature Review 
3.1 State of World Fisheries 
World fish production is an integral part of the global provision of food, supplying at least 15% of the 
animal protein consumed by humans and indirectly supporting food production by aquaculture and 
livestock industries (Mora et al, 2009).  The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United 
Nations has documented the rapid expansion of international seafood trade over the past 20 years 
(Ward & Phillips, 2008). Vladimarsson (2007) estimates that 38% of the world’s seafood now enters 
international trade (compared to 10% of meat (Delgado et al, 2003), just over half of this is 
contributed by developing countries (FAO, 2007) 
Associated with an increase in the international trade of seafood has been a greater acceleration in the 
degradation of world fisheries (Ward & Phillips, 2008).  The FAO, which monitors the state of world 
fisheries has estimated that 80% of the world’s fish stocks are either fully exploited, overexploited or 
have collapsed (Mora et al, 2009). There is concern that many of those that are listed as fully fished 
(52%) are simply in a state of transition to an overfished status (Ward & Phillips, 2008). 
 
There is further concern regarding the impact of the various fishing methods used globally (Worm et 
al, 2006, 2009; Mullon et al, 2005).  Fishing methods such as beam or bottom trawling and shellfish 
dredging alter the benthic habitat of marine ecosystems, the consequences of which are not yet fully 
understood (Schwinghamer et al, 1996; Jones 1992). However, the information available is alarming.  
Worm et al (2006) sought to assess the current and future consequences of destructive fishing 
practices and concluded that “Human-dominated marine ecosystems are experiencing accelerating 
loss of populations and species, with largely unknown consequences.....marine biodiversity loss is 
increasingly impairing the ocean's capacity to provide food, maintain water quality, and recover from 
perturbations” (Worm et al, 2006: 787). 
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As major fish stocks are depleted, there has been a tendency to ‘fish down the food chain’, an effect 
which involves the systematic depletion of lower trophic level species as higher trophic stocks 
become depleted.  This phenomenon is illustrated by a study in the North Atlantic showing that the 
biomass of predatory fishes (with a trophic level  =/<3.75) declined by two-thirds through the second 
half of the twentieth century, even though this area was already severely depleted before the start of 
this period (Christensen et al, 2002; Pauly et al, 2002). 
 
Combined, these issues have resulted in a disquieting state in world fisheries, suggesting that future 
declines are to continue if current fishing practice remains unchanged (Bensch et al, 2008).  One 
study has suggested that the global collapse of all taxa currently fished may occur by the year 2048 
(Worm et al, 2006). 
 
3.2 Measures to Improve Fisheries Management 
 
Globally, there have been numerous attempts to manage fisheries in a sustainable manner (Pauly et al, 
2002).  Examples of successful management have been documented (Wilen, 2006); however their 
success has tended to be location specific and difficult to apply to different species and management 
structures (Stone 1997; Gilman et al, 2008).  In the modern era, fisheries management in developed 
countries has predominantly been conducted by governments and top-down type management, 
however market based mechanisms and voluntary measures have also been used (Symes & Phillipson, 
1997; Nash, 2002) 
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3.2.1 Fisheries Management by Government 
 
Top down or ‘command and control’ (C&C) fisheries management is common amongst developed 
nations.  C&C fisheries management generally involves a governing body (e.g. government, fisheries 
department) regulating the level of fishing effort and catch or fish mortality allowed by fishers, often 
in the form of Total Allowable Catch (TAC), gear restrictions and area closures (Wilen, 2006).  The 
decisions surrounding these policies are often settled upon in highly charged political arenas 
(Tientenberg & Wheeler, 2001).   
 
C&C management requires the governing or standard setting body to consistently obtain robust and 
reliable information about stocks, flows, and processes within the resource system, as well as 
information regarding the human-environment interactions affecting those systems (Dietz et al, 2003).  
This is challenging as fisheries data frequently contains high levels of uncertainty (Bensch et al, 
2008).   
 
Decision makers regularly require information that characterizes the types and magnitudes of this 
uncertainty, as well as the nature and extent of scientific ignorance and disagreement (Moss & 
Schneider, 2000). Moreover, because every environmental decision involves tradeoffs, data is needed 
concerning individual and social values and the effects of decisions on various valued outcomes 
(Dietz et al, 2003).  Because fisheries data is often expensive and difficult to obtain, it is seen as 
preferable that governments are in charge of commissioning fisheries research as they frequently are 
able to invest more resources into research (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2000: 129).  Subsequently better management decisions are in theory able to be made 
based on this data.  However, due to the misapplication of data and the influence from vested 
interests, often this has not proved to be the case (Cummins, 2004).  
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Fisheries management decision making is frequently conducted within a political process that reacts 
to a lack of scientific consensus and information uncertainty by adapting slowly (Wilen, 2006). In the 
minds of many, this impaired political process has brought us to a situation where the entire global 
marine ecosystem is in jeopardy (Stone, 1997; Wilen, 2006; Reiser, 1997; Berkes, 2003).   
 
Fisheries scientists are reported often to view the predominant cause of fisheries decline as bad 
behaviour on the part of the user or extractor (Mullon et al, 2005).  To quote one of the most widely 
cited critiques of conventional fisheries management (Ludwig et al, 1993: 36), “shortsightedness and 
greed of humans underlie difficulties in management of resources” and “wealth or the prospect of 
wealth generates political and social power that is used to promote unlimited exploitation of 
resources”.  The question of why user groups behave badly is not often raised by fisheries scientists. 
Resource users are assumed to be ‘greedy’ and ‘short-sighted’ as a natural condition. Using this view, 
if the objective of management is sustainable fisheries, the aim of policy must be to control and 
restrain the immutable bad behaviour of users (Wilen, 2006).  Consequently, action by fisheries 
managers frequently involves controlling fishing mortality with top-down measures (Fela, 2010). 
 
The points of failure in such systems are potentially many.  Critics note that controlling fish mortality 
is more difficult than it appears. Fishing practices tend to differ in how they disrupt critical ecological 
components (Reiser, 1997).  Thus, it is not enough to control the amount of effort expended on 
fishing.  Overfishing is often the result of a failure to control where, when and how fishing occurs.  
Grafton et al (2007) noted that in many cases the C&C approach has been unsuccessful because 
fishers have been able to substitute from regulated to unregulated inputs in what has been called 
‘capital stuffing’. In this game, managers are forced to apply ever more stringent controls over a wider 
range of inputs, sometimes termed an ‘input control spiral’ (Grafton et al, 2006). In turn, this makes 
enforcement more difficult whilst making it more costly to fish.   
 
C&C management requires robust information inputs being fed to policy makers in order that policy 
makers take the best course of action by the data supplied (Thorson et al, 2010).  When governments 
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lack the will or resources to safeguard ‘protected areas’, major environmental damage comes from 
hard-to-detect ‘nonpoint sources’, and when the need is to encourage innovation in behaviours or 
technologies rather than to prohibit familiar ones, C&C approaches may be less effective (Hannesson, 
1993; Surronen & Sarda, 2007. They are also economically inefficient in many circumstances (Berkes 
& Folke, 1998; Heal, 1998; Colby, 1995).  
 
Many economists believe that at the heart of the problem, bad behaviour is not inherent in fishers as 
individuals but is induced by the governance systems they are forced to operate within (Heal, 1998, 
Fela, 2010). In particular, fishers’ fundamental decision-making incentives are distorted by insecure 
harvest privileges so that they are led to compete wastefully with each other, and with managers, for 
increased quantities of fish (Thorson et al, 2010). Insecure harvest privileges, in turn, are a historical 
artefact of the peculiar institutions within which fishers and other user groups operate in most modern 
fisheries (Wilen, 2006).  Ludwig et al (1993) also points out that failure is often attributed to a 
political process that does not listen to scientists or that is captured by those out to promote unlimited 
exploitation of resources.  
 
A second commonly used management tool by governments is that of ‘rights based management’ or 
‘property rights’.  During the 1980’s-1990’s many fisheries management critics argued the root cause 
of poor fisheries management decisions was motivated by economic self-interest (Cloutier, 1996).  
They propose that overfishing occurs due to resource appropriators competing in an open access 
system and being un-willing to incur certain short-term losses to achieve long-term gains (Reiser, 
1997).   
 
The preferred solution was to assign individual ‘property rights’ in the form of Individual Fishing 
Quotas (IFQ’s) to overcome the issue of common pool losses (Christy, 1973; Batstone & Sharp, 2003; 
Homans & Wilen, 2002).  The idea was to define the resource (in the case of fisheries this would be 
stock levels), determine which level of extraction would allow for sustainability of the resource (e.g. 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY)) and divide this amongst a defined set of appropriators (fishers).  
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In doing so, it was believed sustainability could be obtained as the total amount of extraction could 
only ever reach a previously defined sustainable limit.  Concurrently, because the fishers have 
ownership of their resource portion, it was thought there would be an incentive to ensure the future 
sustainability of a fishery as overall stock levels determine the present level of catch now and in future 
(FAO, 1999).   
 
IFQ systems have been implemented in 148 countries including New Zealand, Iceland, the 
Netherlands and Canada, all with varying success.  In 2008, a global scale study of quota based 
management systems such as ITQ’s concluded that overall quota systems helped prevent the collapse 
of declining fish populations.  It was found that catch share fisheries were only half as likely to 
collapse (Costello et al, 2008).  However, not all cases have proven positive with some resulting in 
static or declining biomass (Chu, 2009). 
 
3.2.2 Voluntary Measures 
Voluntary agreements in fisheries management occur when the fishing industry agrees to implement 
measures to improve fishing sustainability on their own accord.  Measures often include gear 
restrictions, designation of no fishing zones, lowering TAC’s and restricting fishing season duration 
(Symes & Phillipson 1997).  Industry bodies often introduce voluntary measures in response to 
diminishing fish resources or public pressure (Dietz et al, 2003).  Voluntary measures are an 
important tool used by industry to communicate their ‘commitment’ to sustainability and corporate 
social responsibility (See Ward & Phillips, 2008) (Wilen 2006).   
 
Whilst there have been several positive examples of the use of voluntary measures in fisheries 
(Gilman et al,  2008; Surronen & Sarda, 2007), voluntary measures have failed in many cases to curb 
un-sustainability in fisheries (Terra Nature, 2004; Dietz et al, 2003; Symes & Phillipson, 1997). 
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By nature, voluntary measures are generally enacted where a positive incentive is perceived by the 
industry (Nash, 2002).  Success appears to depend on the existence of incentives that will benefit 
leaders over laggards, creating a potential market advantage and positive public image for the leader’s 
product (Dietz et al, 2003).   
 
The Commission of the European Communities (CoEC, 1996: 6) identifies at least three potential 
benefits to voluntary agreements: 
 
 1. The encouragement of a pro-active cooperative approach from industry, which can reduce conflicts 
between regulators and industry. 
 
2.  Greater flexibility and freedom to find cost-effective solutions that are tailored to specific 
conditions. 
 
3. The ability to meet environmental targets more quickly due to decreased negotiation and 
implementation lags. 
 
However, the extent to which voluntary measures actually benefit the sustainability of fish stocks is 
questionable.  In some cases, closed areas have either already been heavily exploited, contain little 
fish of economic value (e.g. Benthic Protected Areas in New Zealand), or are rarely fished in the first 
instance (Symes &Phillipson, 1997).  TAC reductions are frequently agreed upon in response to 
declining catch levels, reflecting reduced fish stocks as opposed to precautionary limits (Cloutier, 
1996; Teitenberg & Wheeler, 2001).  Additionally, the governing and regulation of voluntary 
measures is highly problematic.  Voluntary measures are implemented and agreed upon by industry 
and sometimes governing bodies.  Because measures are an industry initiative it is easier for actors to 
dilute policy and/or not implement changes at all with little possibility of enforced consequences 
(Terra Nature, 2004).  The ease with which industry can flout their own rules creates an incentive to 
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apply voluntary measures where conditions are favourable, only to relinquish them when conditions 
become challenging (Surronen & Sarda, 2007; Teitenberg & Wheeler, 2001; Nash 2002). 
 
3.2.3 Market Failure 
 
Proponents of using the market as a fisheries management tool suggest that governments should use 
market based mechanisms as frequently as possible by creating markets or market conditions 
(Dubbinik & Vliet, 1996).  Advocates suggest that governments often use the wrong instruments to 
tackle public issues, assuming public issues arise from “market failure” (Baumol & Oates, 1988; 
Pearce & Turner, 1990).  Market failure occurs when “the price mechanism or the social market 
system, the so called invisible hand, fails to bring about a social optimum” (Tisdell 1993: p. 7).  If the 
status quo requires individuals to behave in a way that produce a social optimum; the incentive 
structure is that public and private interests diverge and the policy objective is to re-set these so that 
private interests align to public interests (Dubbinik & Vliet, 1996).  Market failure occurs when social 
optimum is not attained and the allocation of goods and services becomes inefficient. 
 
C&C regulations attempt to correct for market failures through legal and administrative measures, 
however these may fail to correct market imperfections (Neher, 1990) or generate cost misallocations.  
As a result, governments have had to invest enormous amounts of resource and effort to correct 
unwilling subjects.  As a means to remediate this dilemma, many governing bodies have employed the 
use of Individual Transferrable Quotas to answer market imperfections.  The use of ITQ’s is a major 
step towards individual property rights intended to help restore the ideal workings of the market 
mechanism and assailing the problems of governability (Hannesson, 1993; Pearse, 1994; Dubbinik & 
Vliet, 1996). 
 
Advocates of ITQ and property rights systems suggest that ITQ’s could solve biological, economic 
and administrative issues of fisheries considerably (Fela, 2010).  The biological issues – the (threat of) 
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depletion of the fish stocks – are said to be quelled because ITQ’s enable individuals to act as private 
owners of a resource, having an interest in the conservation of their resource by protecting their ITQ 
asset.  The economic issue, which is evident in the waste of labour and capital in superfluous catching 
capacity, excessive costs and (generally) reduced incomes (Pearse, 1994) is said to be softened as long 
as ITQ’s enable individuals to escape the prisoners dilemma (Le & Boyd, 2007), and make 
independent decisions about how to apply and organize the available production factors (Dubbinik & 
Vliet, 1996).  Additionally, as quotas are transferrable, the market mechanism should stimulate a price 
on them, thereby bringing about a trend where quotas are transferred from least efficient to the most 
efficient fishers (FAO, 1999).   
 
Experience has shown the pitfalls of the market based mechanisms in fisheries management (Dubbink 
& Vliet, 1996; Gibbs, 2010; Leadbitter, 2008).  ITQ’s have shown to produce excessive fishing 
capacity in fishers, resulting in a fight between financial gain and governmental regulation.  The 
governance of the Dutch North Sea flatfish sector by ITQ’s is an example of this.  When ITQ’s were 
introduced to the fishery in 1977, the catch was set approximately 50% less than the previous season 
(Salz, 1991), leaving the fishing fleet greatly overcapacity.   
 
Because the larger fishing vessels were financed on the basis of easily accessible loans, fishers felt 
that on one shoulder there was pressure from the bank to keep on fishing, whereas on the other 
shoulder the government was applying pressure to reduce fishing.  The fishers predominantly decided 
to do the former, enabled by weak monitoring and enforcement policy; low fines for violations; and 
logistical and administrative help from auctions (Dubbinik & Vliet, 1996).   
 
Between 1977 and 1987 the beam trawler fleet increased from 495 vessels to 616 vessels (LEI/DLO 
Fishery Department, 1991), increasing capacity and catch effort required.  This trend forced the 
government into greater regulation; however this still did not correspond with sustainable fishing 
practice.  One such regulation was implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture, stating that if there 
was proof that the season’s quota had been met early, the season would be closed at this point, even if 
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individuals had not caught their individual allocation.  Because fishers knew the season could be over 
at any point, the uncertainty motivated fishermen to race even harder for fish than before (Dubbinik & 
Vliet, 1996).  
 
This particular case demonstrates some of the major pitfalls of market failure in fisheries 
management.  Market based regulations surrounding fishing only make fishers more determined to 
extract their ITQ as rapidly as possible. 
 
3.3 Eco-labelling: a new Tool in Fisheries Management 
 
During the past twenty years, there has been an increasing recognition that more traditional fisheries 
management methods, targeted at the supply end of the market are insufficient to guarantee the goals 
of resource conservation through sustainable fisheries production and may generate economic 
inefficiency (Caswell & Anders, 2009). This has brought a more concerted focus towards the opposite 
(consumer) end of the market spectrum (table 1).  The thought is that if the producers cannot be 
effectively regulated by a top-down governed fisheries management framework, then influencing 
producers via a bottom up approach may deliver a more effective structure to fisheries management, 
promoting a different set of incentives and mechanisms (Barham, 2002).  The role of the consumer in 
the market system is the role of a purchaser of goods provided by the market producers (Bostrom, 
2006).  Therefore, any bottom-up fisheries management would need to influence consumer 
purchasing preference. The power of this approach is that producers require consumers to buy their 
products to make profit and to remain competitive in the market.  It is the goals of most producers to 
have consumers prefer their products over another producer’s product in order to increase their market 
share (Mason, 2008).  
 
To effectively promote sustainable fisheries, the consumer would need to obtain information 
regarding the state of the fishery, production methods, processing methods and environmental impacts 
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of the fishery. Due to the search and information costs of obtaining such knowledge, this is impossible 
to accomplish singly for even the most astute consumer (Gullastigue, 2002).  This barrier to 
information results in what economist’s label ‘imperfect information’. If everyone has perfect 
information (on price and quality attributes) then every buyer will select exactly the composition of 
price and quality that he or she wants from the market, or will not buy at all if no offering is desirable 
(Caswell & Anders, 2009).   
 
Imperfect information can lead to market failures.  Market failures occur in this context when “there 
is demand for products of a particular quality but the market does not provide them because of a lack 
of information or of market mechanisms to serve that demand” (OECD, 2009: 6).  For example, 
consumers may be willing to pay for a fishery product with high quality attributes but only if they can 
be assured of this quality level.  The market fails if sellers cannot credibly assure quality and 
consumers cannot discern quality.   
 
A second example of market failure occurs when demand is societal rather than consumer driven.  For 
example, epidemiological data may link a food-borne illness to a particular type of fishery product.  
Consumers may not make the connection between incidents of illness and specific foods.  The market 
may fail to give incentives to companies to produce safer products because of the consumer’s lack of 
awareness and an inability of watchdogs to identify and punish offending companies (Hannesson, 
1993).   
 
Obtaining sufficient information regarding quality takes considerable time and effort, resulting in high 
search costs (Nelson 1970, 1974).  The benefit of gaining more information will be larger the greater 
the product cost.  Concurrently, gaining more information has an opportunity cost that varies, for 
example, with a consumer’s socio-demographic profile (e.g. income).  Consequently, a buyer’s 
marginal willingness to pay for information and the marginal costs of obtaining the information will 
vary. 
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In an attempt to overcome this asymmetry of information and to harness the power of consumer 
purchasing preference to promote sustainable fisheries, the use of eco-labelling and certification 
schemes has been promoted (Jaquet & Pauly, 2007; Potts & Haward, 2006).   
 
An eco-label (EL) is a mark or label placed on a product certifying that the product complies with set 
standards (e.g. fishing sustainability) as defined by the labelling organisation.  Eco-labelling schemes 
bridge the knowledge gap between producers and consumers by communicating product information 
that is normally unseen by the consumer (Gullastigue 2002; Mason 2008).   
 
In most cases, the labelling organisation will have designed a set of criteria that participating 
producers must comply with in order to obtain the rights to use the EL on their product.  The criteria 
for certification reflect the aims of the labelling organisation and the types of practice they wish to 
promote (Barham, 2002).   
 
The idea is that consumers will recognise an EL as a way of communicating that the product is 
produced in a more desirable (in the case of fisheries, sustainable) manner and therefore should be 
purchased over products that do not have such a label.  Eco-labelling represents information that the 
consumer could never know about a product, reducing information a-symmetry and empowering the 
consumer to make more informed purchasing choices (Barham, 2002; Youssef & Ayed, 2008). In the 
case of fisheries, if the consumer feels a sense of social responsibility to promote sustainable fisheries, 
then it is thought that this consumer will purchase eco-labelled seafood over non-labelled seafood, 
even if this incurs a greater financial cost.  By reducing the search costs of sustainability information, 
the consumer is freed up to make a more informed product selection (Mason, 2008; Ward & Phillips, 
2008). Because the use of EL’s has been primarily confined to the past two decades, confirmation of 
this effect is limited.  Several studies however do provide evidence of this (Teisl et al, 2007; Veisten, 
2009; Thøgersen et al, 2010) 
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By creating consumer preference in the market, the EL gives an incentive to companies to seek and 
comply with eco-labelling schemes to remain competitive or increase their market share (Table 1).  
By encouraging participation in eco-labelling schemes, eco-labelling organisations incentivise a 
proportion of the industry to act in a manner reflecting the goals of the organisation.  In the case of 
fisheries, eco-labelling may require fishers to catch, process and transport seafood in a sustainable 
manner in order for such suppliers to obtain certification of compliance with the label. This type of 
incentive reduces the need for top-down fisheries management, motivating fishers to comply or risk 
losing profits and market share (Sammer & Wustenhagen, 2006). 
Table 1. Factors that Influence the Effectiveness of Private Environmental Regulatory Regimes (Espach, 2006: 
61) 
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3.4 Eco-Label Examples 
There are numerous examples of EL’s used globally.  The EL database ‘Ecolabel Index’ tracks 431 
EL’s (http://www.ecolabelindex.com. 07/03/2012).  It is impossible to give examples for every EL.  
For the sake of brevity, three established EL examples are provided below.  Each example 
demonstrates the development and implementation of an EL.  
 
3.4.1 Dolphin Safe Tuna 
 
Canned tuna is the second most consumed seafood by quantity in America (NOOA, 2002).  The 
majority of tuna is sourced from the Eastern Tropical Pacific (ETP), accounting for almost one quarter 
of the world’s tuna catch (National Research Council, 1992).  It is well known that dolphins are often 
associated with yellowfin tuna in the ETP (Teisl et al, 2002).  As a result, dolphins have been targeted 
by fishers in the ETP as a way of finding tuna.  During this process dolphins may be killed, and up 
until a few decades ago no mitigation action was taken.  From 1960 to 1972 the US National Research 
Council (1992) estimated that on average more than 100,000 dolphins were killed each year by the 
U.S. tuna fleet and, in the early 1970’s, biologist began warning that commercial tuna fisheries in the 
ETP threatened dolphin populations (Congressional Research Service, 1997).  
 
During the late 1980’s, consumers became aware that the harvest of yellowfin tuna in the ETP caused 
the incidental mortality of dolphins (Teisl et al, 2002).  Media attention ensued and the issue 
generated significant controversy, eventually resulting in calls for consumer boycotts of canned tuna.  
As a result, the three largest tuna canners in the U.S. market announced a dolphin safe labelling policy 
in April 1990 (Shabecoff, 1990).  Additional canners quickly followed suit.  The U.S. government 
responded by passing the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act of 1990 which mandates that 
tuna products cannot be labelled as “dolphin safe” unless dolphins were not used to capture tuna 
during the entire trip, as verified by an on-board observer.  The combination of U.S. laws and eco-
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labelling effectively closed the U.S. market off to tuna caught where dolphins were at risk (Joseph, 
1994). 
 
3.4.2 Forest Stewardship Council 
 
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an international conglomerate of environmental and social 
NGOs, producers and retailers of forest products, and certification agencies that promote standards for 
environmentally, socially and economically sustainable forest management (Espach, 2006).  Founded 
in 1993, the initial aim of the FSC was to unite an array of sustainable forestry labels under a single, 
global eco-label so that buyers could confidently purchase wood certified as coming from sustainably 
managed forests.  FSC is the only forest certification scheme to have standards based on continued 
participant performance in their requirements of compliance (Jenkins, 2000).  By offering both forest 
certifications and chain of custody certifications the FSC is able to certify products across the supply 
chain.  The FSC has been considered a pioneer of this market based “eco-consumerist” approach 
(Hochstetler, 2003).  FSC international also sets worldwide compliance, auditing, and enforcement 
procedures.  Independent, external verifications by an accredited auditor are mandatory.  Audits are 
required every six months for chain custody certification during the first four years.  Enforcement is 
left up to public monitoring and an open investigative process.  Any individual or group can call for 
the investigation of a local FSC certification, a process that consists of outside reviews, requiring full 
reports from all major local stakeholders (Espach, 2006).   
 
The impact of the FSC was recognised within a few years.  Both supply and demand for certified 
timber grew dramatically in the 10 years after the founding of the FSC (Taylor, 2005).  By mid 2002, 
over 109 million hectares of forest was FSC certified under all schemes, representing some 18% of 
the 600 million hectares expected to produce wood in the following three decades (Atyi & Simula 
2002: 10; Van Dam 2003: 3).  In 2010, over 120 million hectares of forests were FSC certified in over 
80 countries – the equivalent of roughly 5% of the world’s production forests (FSC, 2010). The rapid 
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growth rate in FSC certified products is a response to market demand for FSC certified products. The 
value of FSC labelled sales is estimated at over $US20 billion,   demonstrating a growing political and 
economic force endorsing and promoting the FSC system (FSC, 2010). The growth in FSC certified 
wood products is expected to increase in future as market players continue to recognise the advantage 
of becoming certified (Taylor, 2005).   
 
3.4.3 KRAV 
 
The KRAV EL is native to Sweden and is an example of a more recently developed multiple attribute 
EL, incorporating criteria related to many types of environmental aspects and for several stages of the 
product’s life cycle (Thrane, 2009). Whilst FSC is multi attributed by focussing on multiple areas of 
production (e.g. chain of custody, environmental harm), KRAV’s labelling criteria include less 
common areas of focus such as animal welfare and energy consumption (KRAV, 2011).  KRAV is 
organised and associated with, at present, 27 members representing farmers, processors, trade, 
environmental and animal welfare interests (KRAV, 2011).   Around 3, 000 farmers and 
approximately 450 companies in processing and trade are associated with KRAV. At present there are 
more than 5, 500 KRAV-certified products. Five Certification Bodies carry out inspections according 
to KRAV standards (KRAV, 2010) 
 
When looking at the fisheries component of KRAV, there is a focus on aspects of sustainable fishing 
that other eco-labels have omitted such as energy policy, climate change and animal welfare (Thrane, 
2009).   
 
These criteria demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the KRAV eco-label, addressing many types 
of environmental aspects in several life cycle stages (Thrane, 2009).  In 2010, KRAV carried out a 
major survey of public opinion with the help of the consumer research company SIFO. The results 
showed that:  
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 99% of the Swedish population knew of the KRAV label 
  59% regarded the KRAV label as very positive 
 In a comparison of common food labels, KRAV was rated highest in regards to quality 
 
The KRAV model is an example of the successful application of an eco-label model on a national 
scale.  At this scale, public awareness and quality perception is very good.  Because KRAV focuses 
on many non-traditional aspects of environmental management, it has the potential to address many 
different environmental issues at once.  Given its local popularity, it is in an even greater position to 
achieve this as producers are increasingly required by consumers to be KRAV certified.   
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3.5 Summary 
This literature review has covered much of the background theory and reasoning behind the design 
and use of EL’s.  The review describes many of the recent sustainability trends in global fisheries and 
provides a real world context in which global fisheries management is based.  A thorough assessment 
of widespread fisheries management tools is given, focussing on: traditional top-down management, 
market based instruments, voluntary measures and property rights.  
 
This review makes it clear that the described fisheries management tools have failed to holistically 
curb unsustainability in global fisheries. Eco-labelling presents a new tool in fisheries management 
and has the potential to be an effective agent of change in fishing sustainability.  By removing 
asymmetries in information and empowering the consumer to make sustainable choices in their 
purchase, EL’s can incentivise producers to become certified in order to remain competitive, 
promoting the EL’s values. 
 
Three EL examples have been given: Dolphin Safe Tuna, Forest Stewardship Council and KRAV.  
Each provide an illustration of an established EL scheme and give insights into the different areas of 
influence an EL can target.   
 
The implementation of eco-labelling in seafood has been a relatively new concept, only being 
promoted consistently in the past twenty years.  Due to seafood EL’s being in their infancy, their full 
success is still largely unknown.  Initial indications suggest that there is merit in the EL argument, but 
this will require further research and investment as the effects of current EL’s become fully known. 
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4.0 The Marine Stewardship Council 
 
4.1 Background 
 
Observing the decline in global fisheries and the ineffective fisheries management systems governing 
them, many authors in the late 1980’s began to support the concept of eco-labelling as an important 
tool in fisheries management (Cummins, 2004).  Whether out of direct support or sheer frustration at 
the lack of alternatives, environmental agencies and institutions began to explore the feasibility of a 
global scale eco-labelling programme in fisheries (Salzman, 1991; Teisl & Roe, 1999; Wessells et al, 
1999). 
 
In February 1996, Unilever and the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) responded by 
announcing a joint eco-labelling venture called the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). The MSC is 
designed to create a global system of sustainable fisheries that will “provide powerful economic 
incentives for sustainable well-managed fishing” (WWF, 1996a) and thereby “halt a catastrophic 
decline in the world’s fish stocks by harnessing consumer power” (ANP, 1996). 
 
The MSC is an outgrowth of WWF’s 1994 Endangered Seas Campaign (WWF, 1996b) and is based 
on the Forest Stewardship Council programme established in 1993 (WWF 1996a).  A critical 
component of the MSC establishment was the partnership between WWF and Unilever. In 1997, 
Unilever had a twenty-five percent share of the European and US frozen fish market and also had 
major fishmeal and fish oil enterprises (Smelly, 1997 in Constance & Bonnano, 2000).  In 1997 
Unilever received nearly US$50 billion in sales, marketing over 100 brands through its 300 subsidiary 
companies with operations in 88 countries (Unilever, 1998).  With such a large market share, Unilever 
was an ideal partner for WWF as a market foot-hold could already be established from MSC’s 
conception. 
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4.2 The MSC Concept and Vision 
 
Whilst WWF and Unilever may have had different motives for creating the MSC, they stated a shared 
objective aimed at ensuring the long-term viability of global fish populations (WWF, 1996a).  
According to Michael Sutton of WWF, “The history of fisheries management is one of spectacular 
failures. By working together with progressive seafood companies, we can harness consumer power 
in support of conservation and make it easier for governments to act” (Constance & Bonanno, 2010: 
194). Caroline Whitfield of Unilever concurs with Sutton, adding that, “Two of our core principles 
are that sustainable business is good business, and that we work in partnership to meet our goals. 
This initiative, on behalf of millions of consumers, is entirely consistent with these principles” 
(Constance & Bonanno, 2010: 194). 
 
In April 1998, the MSC released its first public draft of their “Principles and Criteria for Sustainable 
Fishing.”  These principles are intended to guide the efforts of the Marine Stewardship Council 
towards the development of sustainable fisheries on a global basis (MSC, 2010a): 
 
1. A fishery must be conducted in a manner that does not lead to over-fishing or depletion of the 
exploited populations and, for those populations that are depleted; the fishery must be 
conducted in a manner that demonstrably leads to their recovery. 
 
 Intent: “To ensure that the productive capacities of resources are maintained at 
high levels and are not sacrificed in favour of short term interests. Thus, 
exploited populations would be maintained at high levels of abundance designed 
to retain their productivity, provide margins of safety for error and uncertainty, 
and restore and retain their capacities for yields over the long term” (MSC, 
2010a: Pg. 5). 
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2. Fishing operations should allow for the maintenance of the structure, productivity, function 
and diversity of the ecosystem (including habitat and associated and dependent and 
ecologically related species) on which the fishery depends. 
 
 Intent: “To encourage the management of fisheries from an ecosystem perspective 
under a system designed to assess and restrain the impacts of the fishery on the 
ecosystem” (MSC, 2010a: Pg. 5). 
 
3. The fishery is subject to an effective management system that respects local, national and 
international laws and standards and incorporates institutional and operational frameworks 
that require use of the resource to be responsible and sustainable. 
 
 Intent: “To ensure that there is an institutional and operational framework for 
implementing Principles 1 and 2, appropriate to the size and scale of the fishery” 
(MSC, 2010a: Pg. 6). 
 
 
 
4.3 Comprehensiveness of Standards:  
 
The Principles and Criteria for MSC certification sought to build on the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995a), the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (FAO, 1995b) through an inclusive consultation process between 1996 and 1999 (MSC, 
2003).  This process involved more than 300 organisations and individuals, included two expert 
drafting sessions and a series of international workshops in various regions around the world.  
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As work on the MSC Principles and performance requirements progressed, it became evident that the 
MSC would need to draw stringent boundaries around what should and should not be included 
(O’Riordan, 1997).  Essentially, MSC had to decide if the principles and criteria only should address 
fishing operations and environmental issues, or if they should also address social and development 
issues (Auld, 2007).  The MSC decided to keep standards narrow, focussing primarily on fishing 
operations and avoiding the deep complexity of development issues.  Standards were based around the 
three principles for sustainable fishing (as above) and are supplemented by a number of more specific 
operational/management criteria.  Independent CBs are required to adapt the Principles and Criteria to 
meet local fishery conditions (Ponte, 2006). 
 
4.4 The Assessment Process 
* For full assessment methodology details, see appendix 5 
 
When a fishery wishes to apply for certification, they notify MSC of their intentions and select an 
independent CB to conduct the assessment (MSC 2010a).  The MSC provide an approved list of CBs 
in which the FC may choose from.   
 
Aside from being the author of the standards, this is the largest participatory role MSC has in the 
certification process (Cummins, 2004). The MSC’s role in the assessment process is primarily 
confined to accrediting the certification bodies whom are tasked with assessing each applicant fishery 
using the MSC Fisheries Certification Methodology.  CBs are independent of MSC in the sense that 
they are not directly paid by MSC, a measure designed to achieve un-biased assessment (Cummins, 
2004).  Instead, they are paid by the FC to conduct the assessment, which itself will be seen to 
generate problems (Highleyman, 2004). 
 
The CB undertakes a pre-assessment to determine if the fishery has a high chance of gaining 
certification in current condition, will gain certification if some elements are altered, or will not gain 
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certification.  If the fishery is considered by the CB to have a good chance of success, the fishery 
proceeds into full assessment.   
 
Where full assessment is pursued, the CB assembles an expert panel to assess the fishery.  The full 
assessment process is governed by a further set of principles which state that the assessment must: 
 
 Ensure relevant and adequate information is available to the CB to aid the fishery assessment.  
 
 Ensure that all opportunities to participate in the assessment process are provided to interested 
parties. 
 
 Ensure that the process is clear and transparent to interested parties. 
 
(MSC: 2010c: 11-12) 
 
Step 2 of the Full Assessment is the stage at which formal assessment occurs and determinations are 
made about fishery certification.  Scoring guideposts and performance indicators are used for different 
aspects of the fishery, in correspondence with the MSC principles (Fig 1).  Scores are out of 100 (i.e. 
the presence of an effective management plan can gain a score of 0-100, zero being non-existent and 
100 being in full compliance).  The fishery is then assessed against these performance indicators.  All 
elements of the fishery must receive a score of at least 60, having an overall scoring average of at 
least 80 to obtain MSC certification.   
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Figure 1. MSC assessment tree hierarchy.  Role of MSC and CB (CB) in defining assessment criteria (MSC, 
2010k) 
 
If the fishery passes the initial assessment, a draft report is compiled for review by the CB.  The draft 
report is reviewed by a group of experts consisting of at minimum the peers of the experts on the 
assessment team.  The Draft incorporates FC response and conditions (if applicable), scores, 
weightings and certification outcomes.  The CB must notify MSC and stakeholders of the proposed 
peer reviewers and allow 10 days for stakeholders and the MSC to submit written comments and/or 
objections as to the selection of a proposed member of the peer review panel (MSC, 2010c). 
 
Once the draft report has been critiqued, the CB publishes the final determination and report, making 
any corrections it deems necessary in response to comments by reviewers or stakeholders.  Should a 
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stakeholder still disagree with the final report, they have the 21day window to initiate the MSC 
Objections Procedure (described later).   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Flow diagram of the MSC certification process. (Available at: http://www.msc.org/documents/get-
certified/fisheries/Assessment_FloChart.pdf/view. Accessed 27/01/2012) 
 
Should the final report be accepted, a chain of custody assessment is carried out.  This involves 
analysing the “procedures implemented by a fishery and subsequent handlers to ensure that products 
from a certified fishery are not mixed with products from any other fishery during processing or 
distribution for retail sale” (MSC, 2010c: Pg. 39).  This type of assessment is carried out on an annual 
basis for all certified fisheries. 
 
Should the chain of custody pass MSC standards, then the fishery is fully certified and licensed to 
bear the MSC logo on their product. 
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4.5 MSC Objections Procedure  
* For full illustration of the MSC Objections Procedure, see appendix 6 
* For full description of MSC Objections Procedure Methodology, see appendix 7 
 
The MSC Objections Procedure is activated when a stakeholder disagrees with the final draft report 
written by the Certifying Body.  The reasons for submitting an objection can be related to three 
categories: 
 
4. The OB identifies a serious procedural or other irregularity in the assessment process that 
made a material difference to the fairness of the assessment;  
 
5. The score given for one or more performance indicators cannot be satisfactorily justified by 
the CB due to factual errors, omission of relevant information or arbitrariness;  
 
6. Additional information has been identified that is relevant to the assessment by the date of 
Determination and was not available or known to the CB. 
 
(MSC, 2009: C146) 
 
The purpose of the Objections Procedure is to “provide an orderly, structured, transparent and 
independent process by which objections to the Final Report and Determination of a CB can be 
resolved. It is not the purpose of the Objections Procedure to review the subject fishery against the 
MSC Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries, but to determine whether the CB made an 
error that materially affected the outcome of its Determination” (MSC, 2010d: Pg. 2).   
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By defining the OP this way, the OB is unable to object based on issues that relate to the MSC 
Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries with which the CB is operating within, rather the OB 
must object to an error or oversight by the CB in its assessment of a fishery.  Therefore, it is not the 
MSC’s core principles that are scrutinised, rather, the assessment methodology of the CB. Outside of 
appointing the IA, MSC is largely independent from the objection. 
 
When the Notice of Objection is received by MSC, an IA (IA) is assigned to the objection case.  The 
IA assesses the objection to determine whether it has “a reasonable prospect of success” (MSC, 2009: 
Pg. 4).   If the IA determines the objection to be worthy of the Objections Procedure, the objection 
proceeds to the formal Objections Procedure.  
 
The formal Objections Procedure is a format in which the CB and OB can state their argument and 
justify their position.  Initially, the IA approaches the CB with the OB’s points of objection in the 
hopes that any issues can be resolved without proceeding to formal adjudication.  If the issues remain 
unresolved, the objection moves to an oral hearing and formal adjudication (MSC, 2009: Pg. 5, sec 
4.7).  The OB may submit any additional material related to the Notice of Objection at this time.  
Before the hearing can commence, the objecting party must sign a contract agreeing to cover the costs 
of objection.  The limit for cost recovery was previously £15,000 (MSC, 2009), however was lowered 
to £5,000 in 2010 (MSC, 2010M).  Should the OB face exceptional financial circumstances, they may 
apply to the IA for a fee waiver (MSC, 2009b: 9). 
 
During the oral hearing, there is an opportunity for the OB(s), the CB and the Fishery to present their 
respective cases in person or via video or teleconference. Should the IA determine that additional 
sessions are required, the hearing may continue at a later date via electronic communications or other 
means (MSC, 2009) 
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Following the oral hearing, the IA issues a written decision either confirming the original 
Determination by the CB or remanding the Determination to the CB. If the Determination is 
remanded the CB has 10 working days to submit a written response to the MSC, FC and the OB.  
 
Written submissions regarding the response may be submitted to the IA no later than 5 working days 
following the response by the CB (MSC, 2010c).  
 
The IA will, within 10 working days of the response by the CB, either accept the response as an 
adequate resolution to the matters raised in the remand and approve the original (or amended 
Determination) or uphold all or part of the objection.  
 
The CB will then consider amending the Final Report and Determination in the light of the findings of 
the IA. The CB is not bound to make any changes if they can satisfactorily justify their reasons to the 
IA.  Finally, this will form the basis for the Public Certification Report. 
 
As of February 2012, thirteen fisheries have gone to adjudication under the MSC Objections 
Procedure (www.msc.org/track-a-fishery, April 23, 2011).  These fisheries include: 
 
1. Danish Plaice Otter Trawl  
2. Gulf of California, Mexico Sardine Fishery  
3. Aker, Biomarine Antarctic Krill Fishery  
4. North East Atlantic Mackrel  
5. New Zealand Albacore Tuna troll  
6. New Zealand Hoki   
7. Antarctic Toothfish  
8. Bering Sea Aleutian Islands Pollock Fishery 
9. Atlantic Swordfish 
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10. Denmark Blueshell Mussel 
11. Fraser River Sockeye Salmon 
12. Pacific Hake 
13. Western and Central Pacific Skipjack Tuna 
 
Of these objections, three fisheries (1, 2 and 5) are currently in progress (01/02/2012), the North East 
Atlantic Mackerel  objection was upheld, and the remaining nine have had their objections declined 
by the IA and the fishery subsequently certified.   
 
In the Antarctic Toothfish objection, the IA found the CB had in fact committed a “serious procedural 
error” (MSC, 2010i: 1), however after the CB’s response, the IA was “satisfied (this) had not made a 
material difference to the fairness of the assessment” .  Other elements of the objection were 
dismissed “subject to certain amendments being made to the Final Report and Determination” (MSC, 
2010i: 1).  Therefore, one part of the objection was upheld, the other declined. 
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5.0 Critique of the MSC Objections 
Procedure 
5.1 Criticisms 
 
Some of the earliest criticisms of the MSC have centred on questions of feasibility and legitimacy.  
This is unsurprising in the early stages of such a programme where the effectiveness of theoretical 
strategies begin to take shape in practice.  However, many of these issues remain relevant.   
 
The most comprehensive, independent assessment of MSC was conducted by Highleyman (2004) on 
behalf of the Homeland Foundation, Oak Foundation and Pew Charitable Trusts.  The assessment 
surveys the concerns of various authors and investigates controversial fisheries which gained 
certification.    Some of the key findings of this report include (See appendix 1 for full list): 
 
1. MSC’s claim of certifying sustainable fisheries in most cases is not justified under the 
definition established by its standards, the Principles and Criteria; 
 
2. Principle 2 requires fishing operations to maintain the structure, productivity, function, and 
diversity of the eco-system on which the fishery depends, but routinely is not met.  MSC has a 
leadership opportunity to drive best practices towards eco-system based management; 
3. MSC has narrowly interpreted the meaning of controversial fisheries in ways that reduces its 
flexibility and ability to guide its own future (original authors wording); 
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4. CBs have too much flexibility in determining how principles and criteria are applied, 
including the thresholds for compliance, allowing for inconsistencies and low thresholds.  
Recognising this, MSC is taking steps to propose greater interpretation and guidance to CBs; 
 
 
5. MSC is not yet considered as a credible consortium organization because key environmental 
stakeholders do not feel that the MSC mission includes them in a substantive way; 
 
6. MSC has made important decisions in the in the last two years to increase stakeholder 
representation on the board but must continue this trend to restore the organization’s 
credibility; 
(Highleyman, 2004: 1) 
 
Highleyman (2004) continued by focusing on the interactions of the MSC principles with the then 
management systems.  MSC promotes its eco-label scheme as a new and effective way to improve 
fisheries management.  But how does this interact with other efforts to reform fisheries management 
policy?  
 
In Australia, Highleyman (2004) concluded that MSC principles and criteria appear to have had a 
positive effect, promoting stronger policy standards by providing the model for Australia’s Guidelines 
for the Ecologically Sustainable Management of Fisheries (MSC, 2003).  However, other case studies 
Found MSC found to be in conflict with some fisheries conservation efforts: 
 
 For the South Patagonian Toothfish, conservationists contend that the certification of this 
stock will interfere with their efforts to stigmatize illegally caught Toothfish from other 
stocks (Stokstad, 2010) 
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 In the New Zealand Hoki Fishery, major conservation groups protested certification and 
recertification of this deep water trawl fishery because of fur seal and bird bycatch that the 
MSC now proclaims part of a sustainable fishery (MSC, 2002). 
 
 For Alaskan Pollock, numerous conservation organizations identified that populations had 
nearly halved since 2004 (Pope, 2010).  They further contend that the MSC certification of 
more than a third of all fish caught in the U.S. as sustainable would give the powerful Factory 
Trawlers Association political cover for sweeping under the carpet significant ecosystem, by 
catch and habitat concerns in this fishery (MSC, 2005). 
 
When such contentious issues arise, the question of which avenue becomes more likely to achieve 
conservation outcomes comes to the foreground.  It is true that conservationists do not always achieve 
their goals; yet conversely it is equally true that MSC does not have the experience or ability yet to 
make the case that certification will achieve them either (Highleyman, 2004).   
 
Because the MSC label is proposed as a means of conveying information regarding a fishery in order 
to the correct market failure of asymmetric information, it is important that the information 
communicated by the label is accurate and reliable (Jaquet & Pauly, 2007).   
 
Many of the above criticisms pose a significant threat to the credibility and transparency of the MSC 
scheme.  One of the key components of maintaining transparency and accountability in the MSC 
certification process is the existence of an Objections Procedure.  Therefore, it is vital that this 
mechanism is functioning in an independent, credible and un-biased way, ensuring certifications that 
the consumer can consistently trust. 
  
During the eleven years MSC has been in operation, issues surrounding the legitimacy of particular 
certifications and the robustness of the Objections Procedure have been raised by several authors and 
environmental agencies (Highleyman, 2004; Forest & Bird, 2007; Gulbrandsen, 2005; Ponte, 2006).  
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Highleyman’s (2004) assessment of MSC raised several negative points regarding MSC assessment 
and the outcomes of some MSC Objections: 
 
The first example of a controversial certification and consequential objection is that of the New 
Zealand Hoki fishery.  The NZ Hoki fishery was first certified in 2002 following a lengthy assessment 
process by the CB SGS.  The of New Zealand (in conjunction with the Environment Conservation 
Organizations of NZ (ECO)) lodged an objection to the initial certification arguing the fishery was 
unsustainable and in danger of collapse. WWF and the Royal Forest & Bird Protection Society New 
Zealand lodged an additional objection during re-assessment in 2007.  Their main arguments 
included: 
 
“Hoki stocks have dramatically collapsed. Since 2001, when the fishery was first certified, the 
Hoki catch has fallen from 250,000 tonnes a year to 100,000 tonnes – a 60% reduction” 
(Forest & Bird, 2007: Pg. 2) 
 
“The fishery lacks a fish stock recovery plan, which is required under the MSC’s own rules. It 
also causes serious damage to the seabed by bottom trawling and routinely kills hundreds of 
seabirds and marine mammals as by-catch every year” (Forest & Bird, 2007: Pg. 2) 
 
The response by SGS was to stick by its initial position, using the freedom MSC standards gives the 
CB to determine scoring guideposts, performance indicators and their subsequent scores (MSC, 
2010b).  In this case, MSC methodologies allowed the CB to define key scoring variables and the 
fishery’s corresponding ratings.  The CB appears able to justify their actions in almost all 
circumstances, provided they can justifiably align their scoring system with MSC Fisheries 
Certification Methodology (MSC, 2010c).  
 
A comprehensive third-party assessment and independent objections panel composed of the CB and 
three MSC appointed, independent experts released this statement post the 2002 Hoki objection: 
70 
 
“… there are several instances ... where the Panel found itself in disagreement with the CB in 
relation to the scores awarded. In each case, the Panel members would have taken a more 
conservative approach and would have awarded a lower score. In the circumstances of this 
particular certification process which received an overall passing score “by the skin of its 
teeth”, a lower score on almost any indicator would have resulted in a failure to recommend 
certification. Taking a holistic view to the overall state of the hoki fishery, the panel sees some 
validity to the OBs’ position that this is not a fishery that should be certified as sustainable.” 
(Sustainable Seas, 2009) 
Whilst MSC has defended the Hoki certification (MSC, 2008), there is much contention surrounding 
the ease in which Hoki was certified and subsequently defended in the appeals process, despite 
showing signs of un-sustainability (Forest & Bird, 2007; Sustainable Seas, 2009; Greenpeace, 2009). 
In 2010 the Yukon River Drainage Fisheries Association (YDRFA) objected to the MSC certification 
of Alaskan Pollock, estimated to be worth nearly $1 billion a year (MSC, 2010L). The YDRFA 
highlight that populations appear to have halved since 2004, with 2009 quotas being cut by nearly 20 
per cent (Pope, 2010). It was also argued that the Pollock fishery took food away from the endangered 
Steller Seal population (Conroy, 2007). The objection was subsequently turned down.  In this 
instance, it was accused that the financial gains of unsustainable fishing influenced the IA’s decision.  
Jeremy Jackson, of Scripps Institution of Oceanography in San Diego, California, said: “Economic 
pressures to keep on fishing at such high levels have overwhelmed common sense” (Pope, 2010: 1). 
Additionally, following criticism towards MSC regarding its market share, it has been argued that 
MSC was particularly keen to certify such an enormous global fishery (Conroy, 2007: 216). 
 
In the case of the 2009 Antarctic Krill objection, the Antarctic Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) 
accused the CB of ignoring valid scientific opinion and disregarding new information.  For example, 
Stephen Nicol (an acknowledged world expert on krill in the Antarctic) made a number of critical 
comments regarding the fishery which the CB mostly dismissed.  He stated that “There is little doubt 
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that the data being collected are insufficient to detect impacts of fishing – and there is no mechanism 
to alter the krill management approach even if impacts were detected” (FisheyFellow, 2010: 1).  The 
CB responded saying “The reviewer is correct, but his concerns do not render the harvest strategy 
ineffective, in our opinion” (FisheyFellow, 2010: 1). Despite these accusations, and the IA identifying 
a “serious procedural error” by the CB, the certification was upheld (ASOC, 2010).  ASOC have 
accused the IA of unjustifiably ignoring its concerns during the objection and allowing the CB to 
easily justify error (ASOC, 2010).   
 
Additionally, several authors have cited ambiguous wordings such as “reasonable", "adequately 
identified" and "appropriate consultative process" in MSC doctrine as empowering CBs to dispel 
condemnation (Peacey, 2000; Jaquet & Pauly, 2008). 
    
5.2 Principal – Agent Issues 
The economic theory of Principal –Agent issues (or agency theory) has been identified in fisheries as 
a point of strife in achieving effective management (Jensen, 2007). 
 
Specifically, agency theory is directed at the ubiquitous agency relationship, in which one party (the 
principal) delegates work to another (the agent), who performs that work (Kirkley et al, 2003). 
 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The 
first is the agency problem that arises when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent diverge 
and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The 
problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. The second 
is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward 
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risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because of the 
different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
In the case of MSC, principal-agent issues and the corresponding incentives of each participant 
become rather complex.  If we begin with the MSC, that is the principal of the CB who as agent 
assesses the FC.  MSC provides the standards and criteria against which fisheries are to be assessed.  
However the CB is also the agent of the FC which pays for the assessment of its fishery and 
certification.  Thus, immediately there is tension of incentives for the CB. 
 
MSC is also the agent of the consumer (principal), conveying information to them in an attempt to 
alter their purchasing behaviour.  This provides a system of simultaneously conflicting incentives.  
MSC (as the agent) is seeking a CB that can competently assess a fishery according to its principles 
(MSC, 2010b).  However, because MSC is non-profit, it receives a large proportion of its finance via 
certification fees and levies collected from the industry (MSC, 2003).   
 
In this respect, MSC has incentive to certify enough fisheries in order to remain financially viable. 
Additionally, to become an effective EL, MSC must certify a large share of the fish producing market, 
further incentivising certification. 
 
Because MSC is reliant on FCs gaining certification, both from a financial and reputation point of 
view, the CB, as the agent to MSC, is incentivised to certify FCs in-order to remain an approved 
assessing body for MSC.  The CB relies on the industry to provide the finance for assessments, 
meaning the FC is the principal of the CB.  Because the CB will lose financial gain if it makes no 
assessment, it is in the interests of the CB to consistently certify fisheries so as not to risk being 
rejected for a more lenient CB.   
 
In the case of MSC, agency theory would suggest that the incentive structure for certification 
promotes the lenient certification of fisheries.  The flow of money from fishery to CB and the need to 
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be recognised by MSC as a credible assessor means the CB  may potentially be under pressure to push 
through certifications where there is controversy surrounding the fishery.  This set of incentives may 
provide some insight into some of Highleyman’s (2004) criticisms of MSC regarding the inability of 
MSC to maintain their own principles and criteria.  Additionally, the inability of OBs to be successful 
may be at least in part attributable to the principal – agent structure of the MSC. 
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6.0 Scope of Research 
As previously stated, it is vital that MSC addresses the asymmetry of information between fishery 
companies and the consumer by conveying accurate and reliable information.  Because of controversy 
surrounding the MSC OP, there is room for research to focus on the legitimacy and robustness of 
MSC objections protocol.  
 
Several criticisms suggest that the CB has too much influence in defining scoring systems for a 
fishery, allowing for ease of self-justification and empowerment (Highleyman, 2004; Stokstad, 2010; 
Pope, 2010, FisheyFellow, 2010).  By having this authority, the CB may proceed to justify the 
certification of a controversial fishery. The following research will seek to explore whether there is 
substance to these claims and if so, how MSC OP methodology may facilitate this. 
 
At the time of writing, there have been ten objections that have come to conclusion, with three in 
progress.  Because of this small number, there is an excellent opportunity to closely look at the 
interactions between parties during an objection, and to assess how the MSC OP methodology and the 
behaviour of each party influence the final decision.  An assessment of how the MSC Objections 
Procedure facilitates interactions between parties and empowers those involved in an objection will 
shed light on the credibility of the MSC OP and consequently the legitimacy of the label in 
communicating sustainability in certified fisheries. 
 
Additionally, an understanding of the objection dynamics can help determine to what extent MSC 
promotes sustainable fishing, and how (if at all) it may be improved to enhance MSC credibility.   
 
 
75 
 
7.0 Results 
7.1 Question Analysis: Objectors 
As previously identified, the research questionnaires were first categorized into broad and sub 
categories (open & axial coding) and further refined during the selective coding process.   
The dominant themes and inter-linkages resulting from this process are presented and 
discussed for each participant type and question category asked.   
7.1.1 Primary concerns 
OBs were asked to explain the primary concerns they raised in regards to the fishery or 
fisheries that were objected to.  Their responses have been refined into four categories: 
Consideration of Scientific Evidence 
Several OBs were concerned with what they perceived to be a disregard for “best scientific 
evidence” by the CB. Complaints centred on ignorance by the CB of crucial fishery 
information that was said to greatly influence the sustainability of a fishery.  These factors 
included: 
 Rapid decline in fish population. 
 No signs of stock recruitment. 
 Ignoring ecological and habitat impacts when setting catch levels. 
 Catch of endangered or threatened marine mammals and seabirds. 
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Insufficient Evidence & Unknown Fishery Effects 
OBs were quick to point out areas in the assessment conducted by the CB where they 
believed there was insufficient evidence to justify the scores given and unknown effects of 
fishing which would materially contribute to the unsustainability of a fishery.   
 
These included: 
 Insufficient evidence that harvest strategies were effective. 
 Ecosystem effects and the impact on larvae distribution from fishing are unknown. 
 Uncertainty and “virtually no knowledge of the frequency and location of spawning” 
in some species. 
 Unknown effects of environmental changes in some fisheries. 
 Unknown stock distinctions (many stocks considered genetically distinct but not 
assessed as so). 
Inadequate Management of Fishery 
Current and proposed management strategies of fisheries came under great scrutiny in several 
objections and formed the basis for the primary argument in several cases.  Concerns 
included: 
 Management structures used in some fisheries “inherently risks overfishing 
populations” by failing to consider “ecosystem-wide impacts”. 
 The management decision making process was heavily criticised in some cases (e.g. 
“decision making process is not adequate to ensure sustainable management of 
the....fishery”). 
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 Management by adjacent countries “undermines the sustainability” of some fisheries,  
particularly those stocks which are not geographically distinct. 
 Lack of formalized and transparent management tools. 
 
Uncertainty and Risk 
A prominent theme to emerge from the data was the consistent criticism of CB’s for not (in 
the OBs’ opinion) accounting for uncertainty and risk associated with data and management 
strategies in fisheries.  Primary areas of concern include: 
 The uncertain impact of “bycatch” species. 
 Uncertainty around the “geographic context” of stocks and their “spawning 
grounds”. 
 Uncertainty surrounding the robustness of stock models. 
 Uncertainty surrounding the impact on “predators” of the target species. 
 Uncertainty surrounding untested management techniques and rules. 
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7.1.2 Addressing of Issues by the Certification Body 
Objecting respondents were asked to state their position on a likert scale regarding how 
satisfied they were that issues raised were adequately addressed by the CB, followed by an 
explanation of their position (See appendix 2C).  The response categories have been divided 
into the likert rankings provided (e.g. Satisfied, neutral, dissatisfied etc), and the dominant 
themes for each response category stated and explained (No OB reported themselves as being 
satisfied/very satisfied). 
Very Unsatisfied 
Ignoring of Public Comments and New Scientific Information.  Responding OBs accused 
the CB of ignoring “new scientific information that was made available before making its final 
determination” which they felt would have “made a material difference to the assessment”.  
Additionally, there were concerns expressed over an apparent lack of “interest in public comments 
submitted during the assessment period”. 
Relationship Between Certifier and Client Creates a Conflict of Interest.  OB’s identified 
that the current MSC structure may influence the agenda of the CB.  One OB stated “The 
current relationship between the certification bodies and the FCs creates a conflict of interest 
in the certification bodies.   The certification bodies are paid directly by FCs, not the MSC, 
and compete with each other for the business of the FCs.  The FCs, then, are able to choose 
certification bodies based on which is most likely to award certification in the fastest time 
possible for the smallest fee and impose the fewest conditions” (sic), 
CB Dismissive of Contrary Conclusions.  In several instances, OBs felt as though the CB 
was dismissive of their evidence and claims presented, despite both being robust in the OBs’ 
view.  This is exemplified by the statement “(the CB) was consistently dismissive of 
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conclusions contrary to their own and often did not make an effort to provide more than 
cursory justifications for their scores and conclusions”.  OBs felt that CBs were often 
“dismissive of peer reviewers who questioned their judgments, even when those peer 
reviewers were experts in the fishery” and felt that the CB was more interested in securing 
certification rather than assessing the fishery in the correct manner. 
Dissatisfied 
Inadequate Justification of Position by the Certification Body. Some OBs found the CB 
was quick to argue that the objection information presented “was incorrect and their scores 
were justified, without adequately justifying their position”, often agreeing to additional 
conditions applied to the fishery but rarely “changing their score”.  One OBs felt this was 
because the CB “did not consider...(the OBs’)  information as valid and convincing enough 
to demonstrate a problem with the fishery”. 
CB Inflexible if Certification Ensured. Scores for the performance indicators of a fishery 
were often highly contentious during objections.  Some OBs felt the CB would often 
manipulate scores in a way that reduced criticism but ensured the fishery would remain 
certified.  One OB demonstrated this specifically by stating “Interesting to see that the score 
for one PI (performance indicator) was lowered and another PI was raised to maintain the 
average P2 score of 80. Another OB felt that the CB had very little “flexibility” when 
responding to issues, with the primary objective being “to defend the assessment”. 
Neutral 
The CB Responded Adequately.  One OB felt that the response given from the CB was 
“adequate” in addressing the issues raised and tried to “accommodate” concerns.  However 
this made no material difference to the outcome of the objection. 
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7.1.3 Adequate Addressing of Issues 
OBs were given an opportunity to discuss the conditions in which they would have felt 
considered their concerns had been adequately addressed by the CB.  The requirements have 
been categorized into four themes: 
Performance Indicators Lowered. This answer seems almost obvious in that the OBs are 
more often than not pursuing the non-certification of a fishery.  However, it was a theme that 
was highly prevalent.  Four Objectors were often not satisfied with minor changes to PI 
scores or additional conditions placed on the fishery.  One OB stated “we would have needed to 
see the CB lower the fisheries’ scores for the performance indicators about which we had concern or, 
presented conclusive evidence justifying their scores” . 
Impartial Certification Body.  As stated previously, there is a perceived conflict of interest 
between the CB and the FC.  This has led one OB to conclude that the CB’s are “clearly 
biased as they work for the “Client””, arguing for an additional “buffer” between the CB 
and the FC.  One OB was displeased with the term “Client” as it implied a bias to a vested 
interest.  To remediate this issue, it was considered by one respondent that the CB should be 
“impartial” and independent from the applicant to reduce incentives to certify. 
Burden of Proof on the Certification Body.  Currently, the burden of proof is on the OB to 
provide reasons why a fishery should not be certified.  As stated by one OB “(the) burden of 
proof....is on stakeholders rather than the FC”.  This is said to become an issue when coupled 
with the (accused) bias of the CB.  Due to conflict of interest, the CB in some cases has been 
accused of appearing to “give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant where data is not 
available”, hindering the robustness of the assessment.  OBs felt the burden of proof should 
be on the CB and FC to demonstrate why their assessment is accurate in light of the objection 
accusations. 
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Precautionary Approach to Assessment.  This theme has some similarity with the first in 
that the lowering of Performance Indicators would have required the CB to espouse a 
precautionary approach to assessment in several cases.  OBs felt that an “absence of data 
should have led to lower scores on....performance indicators, but (often) did not”.  
Uncertainty was seen as a factor that should have required “changes in scores and 
conditions”.  Ultimately, it was recognised that to account for uncertainty in fisheries data 
“meant adopting a more precautionary approach to their analysis of the fisheries”. 
 
7.1.4 Level of Consideration Given by the IA to the Certification 
Body and Fishery Clients’ Arguments and Evidence 
Each OB was asked to give their opinion on the level of consideration they felt the IA gave to 
evidence provided by the CB and FC.  The level of consideration was first defined by Likert 
Scale for the CB and FC (see appendix 2A) and the respondent was given an opportunity to 
explain their answer for each.  The Likert answers chosen for the CB and FC are presented 
below, followed by the refined themes of the corresponding answers. 
Fishery Client: 
Excessive 
Undue Deference to Applicant. In one instance it was considered by the OB that the IA had 
given “undue deference to the arguments of the applicant (FC)” which led to “an acceptance of 
standards” considered unjustified in the case of this fishery. 
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About Right, Too Little 
Both options were selected on two occasions, however no reason was provided for either. 
Certification Body 
Excessive, Too much 
Burden of Proof.  Again this theme was prominent within these answers.  One OB stated 
“Clearly the burden of proof was on the OB to prove that the fishery should not be certified”, 
supported by another stating “The MSC Objections Procedure puts the burden of proof on the 
OB and not the CB”. Because MSC objection rules require the OB to prove “that the CB was 
doing something that “no reasonable” CB would do” it is difficult for an OB “to prove their 
case unless, for example, the CB makes completely egregious decisions”.   
Rule Interpretation and Adherence. IA’s were accused of sticking “to very strict 
interpretations of the objections rules”, often giving the “benefit of the doubt to the CB” 
despite indicating “sympathy with our (the OB’s) arguments”.  This strict adherence to 
protocol is seen as a major stumbling block of the MSC Objections Procedure.  One OB went 
as far as saying “it seemed unless we could prove that the CB said that the sky was green, 
we’d be unable to succeed in our arguments”. 
 
7.1.5 Role Satisfaction of Independent Adjudicator 
OBs were asked to provide their level of satisfaction regarding the role the IA plays in the 
MSC Objections Procedure on a Likert Scale (see appendix 2A), Other) and explain their 
answer.  This is assessed as previously for each Likert category identified. 
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Unsatisfied 
IA Scope too Narrow. OBs found the MSC defined limits surrounding the role of the IA to 
be a hindrance to the Objections Procedure.  As pointed out by one OB “They can only 
confirm the certification or remand the assessment for new scoring or request additional 
considerations”. Consequentially “The IA cannot make a finding that the fishery should not 
be certified”.  In this respect it was felt the “The IA’s purview is too limited” and that and 
objection is more a “matter of process” than an assessment of the fisheries sustainability.  
Another OB supported this notion stating “The only instance in which .... a decision being 
overturned completely (i.e., certification not upheld, several objections have been partially 
upheld but this did not hinder certification) was one that was particularly egregious (Faroese 
mackerel).   
Justification Under Uncertainty. A consistent theme amongst OBs when discussing the 
ways in which CB’s use data in their assessments was that addressing of data uncertainty.  
OBs expressed dissatisfaction surrounding this topic, arguing “it is too easy for CBs to make 
a plausible argument” in the “face of uncertainty”.  OBs indicated that they felt that even if 
the “Adjudicator thinks the argument is wrong, or not really supported by the evidence, the 
bar is so high that he is constrained from upholding the objection unless a score is 
completely unreasonable”. This is considered “the opposite of the precautionary approach 
that is typically associated with a “sustainable” approach to resource use”. 
Satisfied 
Clear and Professional.  In one case the OB found the IA to operate “professionally”, being 
“clear about his jurisdiction” and providing ”clear guidance”. 
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Provided Balance.  Another OB felt the IA “played a clear role in balancing the table to 
give our (the OB’s) concerns more power and importance than was given before by the CB 
and FC”. 
 
7.1.6 Payment of Objections Fee 
Objecting participants were asked to state who they thought should finance the Objections 
Procedure and the reasons for their stance.  Responses are divided into two categories (MSC 
should pay, OB should pay) corresponding with answers given, and the reasoning for each 
are synthesised into main themes. 
 
MSC Should Pay 
Objection Costs too High.  Some OBs felt the fee to lodge an objection is too high and 
served “as a severe impediment to lodging an objection”.  Additionally, an objection 
“requires a substantial amount of staff time on the part of the OB, as well as travel costs”.  It 
was argued by one OB that because of the costs there is a “direct impact on access–and thus 
legitimacy–of the MSC process”. 
Payment Dependent on Merit. A common theme identified amongst OBs was that of 
payment by merit of objection.  Several OBs argue that the IA must first assess the merit of 
an objection before it may proceed to a formal process.  One OB argued that “It should be the 
MSC’s responsibility to ensure that its label is being appropriately applied”.  If the IA 
considers the OBs’ case to have merit then it is “in MSC’s best interests” to go through with 
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the objection and ensure its credibility.  Therefore, MSC should ultimately pay for the 
objection should it be found to have merit by the IA. 
OB Should Pay 
Maintain Fee Waiver Option.  One OB was supportive of OBs paying for an objection; 
however they felt that the option to waive the fee for those organisations who cannot afford 
the resources necessary, should be maintained. 
 
7.1.7 Objections Fee and Barriers to Participation 
Participants were asked to comment on whether they felt the price of the objections fee 
limited the ability of a stakeholder to object.  Their answers have been separated into 
affirmative (yes) and negative (no), with themes developed for each.  It should be noted that 
those that could pay for an Objection were for the most part included in this study 
Affirmative 
Cost of Objection Limits Organizations’ Ability to Object. It was agreed by most OBs 
that “Stakeholder involvement is stifled by costs of participation”.  Because OBs historically 
“rarely win”, the cost of an objection often requires NGO’s “to weigh their odds of a 
successful objection (unlikely in the MSC process) against the fee”.  Whilst the fee has been 
reduced from £15,000 to £5,000 in 2010, it is still considered “too high”.  In several 
instances, “had (a waiver) not been granted” several NGO’s “would not have been able to 
pursue the objection”. Despite the difficulties for NGO’s in finding the funding to object, 
many “still feel obligated to object rather than let certifications proceed unchallenged” 
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Negative 
Process Rather than Cost.  One NGO felt that it was “not so much the cost of the process”, 
but the “complexity, length and frustration of the process” which limits a stakeholder’s 
ability to object. 
 
7.1.8 Improvement to the Objections Procedure 
Participants were asked to comment on ways in which they believed the MSC Objections 
Procedure could be improved (if at all).  The answers have been divided into three themed 
categories which represent the scope of concerns raised. 
Objection Fee 
Fee Elimination. Some OBs felt the objection fee should be “eliminated”, or included in 
“the costs to industry of the MSC certification”.  
IA 
Neutrality. Some OBs felt that the IA’s should be from a “neutral” background, being “truly 
independent and not selected and employed by the MSC”, a relationship which implies a 
conflict of interest. 
Insufficient Expertise. There was concern expressed as to the expertise of IA’s.  Most were 
perceived to be “legal experts” rather than experts in fisheries and sustainability, 
consequently not being “qualified to adjudicate substantive matters of sustainability”. 
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Burden of Proof 
Responsibility of the CB. One OB argued strongly for the development of “standards for the 
level of data/burden of proof required both of the CB and OBs” in response to a “strong 
feeling that a great deal of deference is given to the CB”. Others felt the burden of proof 
should solely be on the CB.  “The burden of proof needs to shift more to certification bodies 
and away from OBs”. 
 
7.2 Certification Body 
7.2.1 Experience with Objections Procedure 
CB respondents were asked to indicate how they perceived their overall experience with the 
Objections Procedure on a Likert Scale (very good, good, neutral, mixed, bad, very bad) (See 
appendix 2A) to explain for their indicated position.  Results are displayed in accordance 
with their Likert answer, with associated themes presented. 
Mixed 
Legal Process Inappropriate. The respondent felt the “(objections) process worked well”, 
however was of the opinion that the Objections Procedure is “essentially a legal process” 
that deals with “technical issues” and this is “not necessarily appropriate”.  The respondent 
expressed a frustration with the Objections Procedure, feeling that “Much of the process was 
taken up with explaining basic issues in stock assessment to non-stock assessment scientists”.  
Despite this, there was acknowledgement that the Objections Procedure “appeared to 
produce improvements in explanation and more robust results”.  
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Inefficient Process. The respondent also felt that the Objections Procedure “seems very long, 
expensive and inefficient”, and indicate that they did “not think it dealt with the concerns of 
the stakeholders raising the objection” 
Bad 
Objections Procedure Open to Abuse. The respondent “agree [‘s] with the Objections 
Procedure in principle, but”, feels that the, “system can be easily abused by people wishing 
to raise [the] profile of own argument, or rally against the MSC as a whole”.  They point out 
that the critical question for the Objections Procedure to answer is “has the assessment team 
made a mistake or come to the wrong judgement”? Because assessments generally must 
“take into account a wide range of views and opinions”, the subsequent outcome is “never 
likely to please everyone”. Recognising this, the respondent was quick to highlight again that 
the question is not, is everyone pleased, “but was the judgement correct, given the 
evidence?” In the opinion of this respondent: “Too often objections seem to allow well funded 
NGOs to continue to put forward their argument – even though those issues are typically 
already taken into account, as part of a balanced assessment”, indicating a dissatisfaction 
with the freedom and scope with which organizations may object. 
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7.2.2 Role of the Independent Adjudicator 
CB’s were again asked to rate their satisfaction regarding the role of the IA in the Objection 
Process and to explain their ratings.  
Neutral 
Applied Methodology Well. One CB seemed reasonably pleased with the role of the IA 
stating “They appeared independent and applied the process methodology reasonably well 
with some exceptions”. However they were critical of the manner in which the IA considered 
some information, pointing out that “there was a tendency to err on the side of caution and 
spend time dealing with issues which had not (sic) material effect on the outcome of the 
case”. 
Issues of Competency.  There was doubt cast over the IA’s competency in assessing issues 
in fisheries science as indicated by the statement “I am not convinced the adjudicator was 
competent to understand fully the issues”.  This was not perceived to lead to “poor 
outcomes”, but rather to result in a more “inefficient process”. 
Satisfied 
Focus on Methodology. There was recognition that the IA’s task is to focus more on the 
“application of methodology”.  This is seen as a “good thing” in that the issues raised often 
boil down to “technical issues – and perspectives / opinions”. 
Tendency to Negotiate. With a focus on the application of methodology, the IA has been 
criticised for “perhaps a tendency to negotiate” between parties which can result in changes 
being made “simply to get a satisfactory outcome for all parties, rather than necessarily 
because it is required / right”. 
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7.2.3 Consideration Given to Evidence/Arguments 
CB’s were asked to give a satisfaction rating regarding how they perceived the level of 
consideration the IA gave to the arguments and to the evidence they put forth. 
Satisfied 
IA Accepted Arguments.  One CB was satisfied with the IA’s considerations because their 
arguments put forth were generally accepted by the IA.  This was not perceived however to 
be due to any favour toward the CB but rather a lack of counter evidence by the OB.  This is 
exemplified in the statement “the adjudicator usually had to accept the MSC assessment 
teams arguments based on our judgement because the OBs were unable to provide evidence 
to conflict with it”.  The CB appears to indicate this is  common during objections by 
pointing out that “Most objections were dismissed” 
Neutral 
OBs Overly Considered.  Another CB was satisfied with the level of consideration given to 
themselves by the IA, but often felt that “the IA will often bend over backwards to listen to 
their (OBs’) view point”.  This is said to occur even where evidence “is submitted late or in 
the wrong format”. 
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7.2.4 Weighting Given to Evidence and Arguments of the Fishery 
Client 
CB’s were asked to give a satisfaction rating regarding how they perceived the level of 
consideration the IA gave to the arguments and evidence that the FC put forth. Only one CB 
responded to this question. 
IA Prefers 3
rd
 Party Evidence.  The CB felt that the IA was “most comfortable with 
information from 3
rd
 parties” (e.g. CCAMLR, ASOC) and often information from the FC 
“was not really critical” 
 
7.2.5 Objections Payment 
CB respondents were asked to state who they felt should pay for an Objection and why.  
Their responses have been categorised into two themes. 
Unsure 
One CB had “no idea” as to who should pay for the costs of an Objection.  Respondents were 
not asked to suggest improvements to the Objections Procedure in this question; however 
they were quick propose some. One stated “I do think the procedure should be a lot less 
costly, clearer and straightforward. It should also more clearly define scope to exclude 
objections which have nothing to do with MSC”.  
Outcome Dependent 
Another CB felt the covering of objection costs “depends on the outcome”.  They argue that 
if “an OB puts in an objection which ultimately results in little or no change – they should 
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pay and pay costs to the FC. However, if the objection has merit and results in significant 
change, or a change in outcome, then the FC should cover their own costs and the cost of the 
CB”.   
Objector Should Pay  
Incentive to Object. CB respondents highlight a perceived connection between cost and 
incentive to object.  “By allowing OBs to object without financial risk or penalty, there is no 
disincentive to object, and objections become more frequent and opportunistic. If an NGO 
doesn’t have to pay to object, and they have a salaried member of staff who can do so, then 
why not object? Even if they only want a small change”.   
Publicity. The Objections Procedure is seen as good publicity for the OB, and the objections 
fee a means of achieving this.  “An objection is very good publicity for an NGO, almost 
regardless of the outcome. Given the tendency to negotiate a settlement, the OB will typically 
get something changed – even if not methodologically warranted, so they can issue a press 
release to highlight the change that they forced. In short, it’s good publicity for the OB 
whether they win or lose, so they may as well object – unless there is a financial penalty”. 
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7.2.6 Objections Fee and Barriers to Participation 
Certification Bodies were asked to comment on whether they thought the objections fee 
hindered the ability of stakeholders to object to a certification.  Both CB’s answered “No” to 
this question; however their answers have been divided into two categories. 
 
Cost is not a barrier to Object 
It was perceived by CB’s that the costs of objection appear not to provide a barrier to 
objection at all.  Both indicated this through statements like “NGO stakeholders seem very 
keen to use expensive legal-type processes” and “most objections come in from organisations 
with plenty of money and salaried individuals able to spend time on it”.  
Cost is a Barrier to Certification 
Both CBs indicated that they felt the objections fee actually provided a disincentive for small 
scale fisheries to apply for MSC certification and “ironically limits the certification to big 
industrial fisheries”.  Their view is based around the question “do the potential costs of 
objection deter fisheries from going into assessment in the first place?”.  The answer to this 
question from the CB’s point of view is presented in this statement: “The current situation 
means that the cost of an objection could exceed the cost of an assessment - even where the 
objection does not result in a material change (i.e the CB reached the correct conclusion in 
the first place).  This is clearly crazy and is a further disincentive for small scale fisheries to 
enter the MSC scheme”. 
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7.2.7 Improvement to the Objections Procedure 
CB participants were also asked how they thought the Objections Procedure could be 
improved (if at all).  All answers are related to methodological improvements, but separated 
into five themes: 
Reduce Complexity 
Despite the MSC methodology being “greatly simplified” after the Revised Fisheries 
Certification Methodology Objections Procedure (MSC, 2010b), making it “much easier and 
transparent to explain a certification”, there are concerns it is again becoming “very 
complex”.  This is a concern to the CB because “Complexity results in errors, and increasing 
likelihood that fisheries will fail or objections will be upheld due to technical mistakes in the 
methodology, rather than because the fishery does not meet the MSC principles fisheries”. 
 
Application of Test 
Although a short answer, one CB stated the Objections Procedure should “apply the spurious 
and vexatious test a bit more robustly and dismiss opportunistic objections”.  This indicates a 
concern with the application of the Objections Procedure and an apparent dislike for the 
process itself. 
Discourage Shotgun Approach 
One CB felt the Objections Procedure encourages a “shot-gun approach to finding fault with 
the MSC assessment” resulting in the OB “objecting to every performance indicator” in an 
attempt to gain traction on any issue.  The CB was of the opinion that “most issues can 
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dismissed out-of-hand, but take time and resources to deal with” and that “this [shotgun 
approach] should  be discouraged” 
Improved Reporting 
It was identified that “many issues can be dealt with by improving clarity in reporting, well 
defined forms of evidence and improved scoping (what falls within MSC requirements)”.  
These issues are thought of as “not require(ing) an Objections Procedure”. It is encouraged 
that a “better way to report the objections should be found”.  “The RSTF report (MSC 
summary report, post objection (for example see MSC, 2005)) which has the submissions 
bound up in the final report making it almost impossible for anyone without enormous 
amounts of free time to follow what went on”.  Because of this, it is difficult for those who 
are analysing the certification of a fishery to accurately synthesise what occurred and the 
criteria used by the CB. 
Avoid Legal Approach 
The legal approach of the Objections Procedure has been criticised by CB’s.  One CB stated 
that “Any method which avoids a legal-type approach would be an improvement in my 
opinion” and further suggested that “the current approach will never be efficient (and 
alarmingly has required personal attendance of people at hearings in some cases)”.  It is 
proposed that a “more in-depth peer review process would be a better approach (e.g. a panel 
of 3 independent assessors with relevant technical knowledge)”, However it is acknowledged 
that “identifying acceptable reviewers may be difficult”. 
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7.3 Fishery client 
There was only one respondent from the FC questionnaire category (see appendix 2D).  
Whilst limited, there is useful information in the response received. These are analysed in the 
same way as previous questionnaires and presented here. 
7.3.1 Experience with Objections Procedure 
Bad 
Objections Procedure Open to Abuse. The FC indicated that they feel the Objections 
Procedure is not just a tool used for genuine concerns about a fishery, but also inter-
organizational dynamics.  “The objection process gives lead to abuses from certain 
stakeholders who do not use the procedure because of genuine concerns with the assessment, 
but because of internal politics in their organisation”.   
Major Costs Involved.  The FC was also concerned with the “huge costs” involved in an 
objection, some potentially equalling “the original assessment costs” through ” extra time 
spent, extra costs (of the) assessment team, travelling costs..”.  Consequently FC’s are “faced 
with a considerable delay in the certification (months)”. 
OB Rights.  The FC expressed that it felt the Objections Procedure empowered the OB by 
attributing them with “all the rights”, ultimately meaning “he (the OB) dictates the 
procedure completely”.  The FC outlines the liberties they feel the OB is free to undertake.  
These include: 
“1/ can throw with mud and allegations in his notice of objection 
2/ decides on the way forward in the negotiation for reconciliation phase 
3/ decides on the oral hearing” 
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7.3.2 Role of the Independent Adjudicator 
Satisfied.  The FC was “satisfied” with the role of the IA primarily because the objection 
“turned out very positive for us (the FC)”, resulting in a favourable ruling. 
Dissatisfied.  The FC was however dissatisfied with the role of the IA prior to the oral 
hearing.  The FC noted that the IA’s role “leaves too limited scope for the IA to move and 
make decisions prior to the expensive oral hearing”. 
 
7.3.3 Consideration Given to Evidence and Arguments 
Mixed 
Pleased at Oral Hearing. The FC felt that the level of consideration by the FC was good 
during the “oral hearing” phase. 
Limited Consideration Prior to Hearing.  The FC felt treatment was different prior to the 
oral hearing and were often given the “impression that the IA did not consider anything and 
just wanted to move to oral hearing. 
 
7.3.4 Weighting Given to Arguments and Evidence 
Very Satisfied 
The FC was very satisfied with the weighting given to their evidence during the objection.  
The FC felt that “the IA’s decision that the fishery was to be certified was due to the weight 
given to our arguments and evidence”. 
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7.3.5 Weighting Given to Arguments/Evidence of the Objector 
Very Unsatisfied 
Negative Publicity.  The primary concern expressed here regarded the impact of an objection 
on individual and organizational reputations and the integrity of those being objected against.  
There was perceived “a lot of negative publicity for the FC and the assessment team that was 
alleged....besides the request for rescoring”.  Despite FC’s being “completely cleared”, 
allegations” remain on the “MSC website for months” allowing room for “speculations and 
harming peoples’ and organisation’s integrity and reputation”.  Regardless of a win or loss, 
“a formal apology or rectification by the OB is NOT in the objection procedure”. 
7.3.6 Objections Payment 
OB Should Pay. Not only does the FC feel the cost of the objection should be “paid by the 
OB”, but also they should pay for “all the costs the objection brings for the FC”. The FC 
illustrates this by stating “the..... fishery would NOT have been able to pay all the costs the 
objection brought along.  The fishery would have been forced to stop the assessment, giving 
in to the OB’s requirements, and not have had the chance to win the objection and be 
certified. In this instance the “industry funded the objection”.  They argue that the costs to 
the OB are “peanuts compared to costs involved for the FC”. 
 
7.3.7 Objections Fee and Barriers to Participation 
The FC was of the opinion that the objections fee did not hinder the ability of stakeholders to 
object, simply stating: “NO, this amount is peanuts compared to what costs are involved for 
the fishery/FC concerned”. 
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7.3.8 Improvement to the Objections Procedure 
Increase the Role of IA. The FC argues that to improve the Objections Procedure, the IA’s 
“role and power” needs to be increased; being “motivated to drop or sustain points in the 
objection at that moment” (moment of objection). 
Oral Hearing up to FC. The FC feels that the decision to proceed to an “oral hearing,”, 
“should be up to the FC/fishery to decide”.  They are clear that this “initiative should NOT be 
left to the OB” (emphasis in the original). The FC goes further into this issue by asking the 
question: “the OB posts an objection explaining concerns, making a case. If the FC/CB 
decide that from the report and the responses given to the objection, the IA has all the 
elements to base her decision upon, why should there be an oral hearing on request of the 
OB?” 
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8.0 Discussion 
8.1 Introduction 
The results of this study have given good indications as to how the MSC Objections 
Procedure is perceived to function by the questionnaire respondents.  There are also insights 
into the distribution of empowerment during an Objection.  OBs were rarely satisfied with the 
components of the Objections Procedure examined, whereas the CBs indicated a much more 
positive purview. The single responding FC gave mixed reactions, tending to take issue with 
the role and actions of the Objecting Body.   
8.2 How Does the Objections Procedure Facilitate 
Interaction Between Actors? 
8.2.1 Objecting Body vs. Certification Body 
For every objecting participant, there were unique and common interpretations as to how the 
CB acted and responded during an objection towards the OB.  These interpretations give 
useful insight as to how the OP may facilitate interactions and empower actors during an 
objection. 
OBs were consistent in their distaste for the way in which the information and issues they 
presented were considered and used during an objection.  This was particularly evident when 
asked how they felt the CB addressed issues raised.  No OB rated themselves as being 
satisfied or very satisfied in this area.  Since only one objection has been upheld, this may 
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seem rather unsurprising.  However the reasons provided were diverse yet also had a degree 
of consistency across Objectors.   
There was an underlying impression that the CB often treated the OB’s case with contempt 
with the primary focus being to defend the assessment, rather than achieving what was best 
for the sustainability of the fishery. 
“(the CB) was consistently dismissive of conclusions contrary to their own and often did not 
make an effort to provide more than cursory justifications for their scores and conclusions”. 
This position was pushed further by an apparent lack of willingness to consider “new 
scientific information that was made available before making its final determination” and 
indicating little “interest in public comments submitted during the assessment period”.   
 
Objectors did not provide any grounds for this type of behaviour; however the questionnaire 
questions did not implicitly require them too. The CBs are endorsed by MSC to be an 
independent scientific body that applies MSC’s Principles and Criteria for Sustainable 
Fishing to a robust assessment scheme (MSC, 2010a).  Therefore, in accordance with FAO 
eco-labelling guidelines (FAO, 2004), CBs should be independent and objective in their 
scope, devoid of any preferential tendencies.   
 
Clearly OB do not consider CBs to uphold these values.  There are few direct reasons given 
for this, however OBs have provided indicators suggesting why CBs may be motivated to 
take this stance.  When placed in context with the MSC OP Methodology we can begin to 
form a picture of potential motivating factors acting on CBs, motivating them to take a 
defensive stance. 
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During the assessment of a fishery, it is the responsibility of the CB to: “actively seek the 
views of the Fishery Client and stakeholders (including managers, scientists, industry and 
environmental NGOs) about the fishery and its performance in relation to any relevant 
conditions of certification and issues relevant to the MSC’s Principles and Criteria for 
Sustainable Fishing” (MSC, 2011b).   
 
Should a stakeholder believe this failed to occur or that “the Certification Body failed to 
consider material information put forward in the assessment process by the fishery or a 
stakeholder” (MSC, 2009: Section 4.8.2) they may file an objection on these grounds. 
 
The opinions expressed by OBs may have some merit in light of the responsibilities assigned 
to CBs by the MSC OP Methodology (see MSC, 2009).  The OP is designed “to determine 
whether the CB made an error that materially affected the outcome of its Determination”.  It 
is not the purpose of the OP “to review the subject fishery against the MSC Principles and 
Criteria for Sustainable Fisheries” (MSC, 2009: Section 4.2.1).   
By defining the Objections Procedure in this way, the CB is placed in a defensive position by 
requiring a validation of their assessment. It then could be argued that CBs are motivated to 
look less objectively upon a OBs evidence in order to justify their position, rather than ensure 
the quality of the assessment. Because an objection cannot challenge MSC’s Principles and 
Criteria, the objection is purely focussing on the OB’s assessment.  Additionally, an OB 
cannot claim issue with the MSC guidelines used to shape their assessment when confronted 
with objection claims. 
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Accusations of bias and non-objective information amongst fishing industry scientists are not 
recent (Mowat, 2004; Standing, 2008). Industry scientists have frequently been accused of 
hiding information or manipulating data in ways that represent a certain party’s interests 
(Sumaila & Jaquet, 2008).  These types of accusations give rise to scepticism and distrust 
regarding the objectivity of fisheries data (Mowat, 2004). 
 
It has been suggested by several OBs that MSC Certifiers are in fact not independent but are 
motivated to act unobjectively due to conflicted interests.  This concern is expressed by one 
OB who stated: 
 
“The current relationship between the certification bodies and the FCs creates a conflict of 
interest in the certification bodies.   The certification bodies are paid directly by FCs, not the 
MSC, and compete with each other for the business of the FCs.  The FCs, then, are able to 
choose certification bodies based on which is most likely to award certification in the fastest 
time possible for the smallest fee and impose the fewest conditions”. 
The accusations presented originate from the fact that the FC pays the CB to assess its 
associated fishery and the MSC credits the CB as a suitable assessor (MSC, 2011b). This is 
clearly significant in that it suggests principal-agent issues within the MSC assessment 
structure.   
 
FCs are encouraged by MSC to “take the time to research CBs and choose the one that offers 
you the best service and price for your needs” (MSC, 2011b: 14).  The MSC itself does not 
profit from any certification and all contractual matters between the CB and the FC are dealt 
with between these two players.  The MSC certification guide clearly states that “you, as the 
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FC, are ultimately responsible for ensuring that your CB is giving value for money and is 
capable of delivering the service” (MSC, 2011b: 15).   
 
Principal-agent theory (agency theory) would suggest that principals (in this case the FC) will 
seek to hire an agent (the CB) that will produce the most favourable results (i.e. certification) 
at the least cost (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Because of this, CBs are incentivised to produce the 
most favourable results for the FC at minimum cost while providing a sufficiently credible 
assessment; potentially creating an environment where assessments are passed more easily 
than if the CB was wholly independent of the FC and MSC.  Any such effect would defeat 
the intended purpose of the MSC label which seeks to make available the sustainability 
information of a fishery to customers via the label.  
Such a bias is implied by OBs who consistently expressed concern at the degree to which 
they felt the CBs ignored their comments and inflexibly defended their assessments.  OBs 
noted a willingness to change performance indicator (PI) scores where certification was 
assured or score losses could be compensated by the raising of others.   
 
Such perceived behaviour does little to quell the growing distrust of industrial fishing and 
their conservation efforts.  Sidney Holt, a distinguished marine biologist from the Independent 
World Commission on the Oceans has been quoted as saying: 
 
“I read many of the publications for the fishing industries. For every sentence there may be 
published about . . . conservation, there will be a page or more about the building of more, 
bigger and more powerful boats, the construction of bigger nets . . . Making profits now or 
soon is the name of the real game” (Schoon, 1998: 1) 
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It is important that MSC is not seen appear to be enabling industrial fishing to operate un-
sustainably, behind the sustainable veil of the MSC label. There is a valid case for a review to 
be conducted into the principal agent relationships formed by the MSC structure. In addition 
to creating an atmosphere of distrust by OBs, these relationships leave MSC open to 
criticism, threatening the labels legitimacy and reliability as a transparent communicator of 
sustainability information in fisheries. Because public opinion determines much of an eco-
label’s success (GEN, 2004), it is important that MSC clarify this area of uncertainty in order 
to maintain its integrity in the public eye.   
 
8.2.2 Certification Body vs. Objecting Body 
The views expressed by CBs in regard to the role and function of the CB indicate vastly 
different issues and experiences.  On the evidence gathered, CBs appear to be generally 
satisfied with the OP. Such satisfaction is coupled with an underlying frustration regarding 
the role and parameters allocated to OBs, and the efficiency with which the OP is conducted. 
 
Issues of inefficiency centred on the Objections Procedure requiring large quantities of time 
and resources.  Efficiency was said to be compromised due to the OP focussing on “technical 
issues”, something that was considered “not necessarily appropriate” for the types of issues 
faced in an objection. 
 
One CB was vexed at having to explain “basic issues in stock assessment to non-stock 
assessment scientists” during an Objection. This viewpoint is interesting not only because it 
relates to the OP efficiency, but also alludes to contempt regarding OB’s expert qualifications 
despite many OBs having substantial experience in fisheries, often being experts themselves.  
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Additionally it may give insight as to why OBs feel that CBs can disregard their scientific 
opinion.   
 
It is common for CBs to explicate elements of their assessment and data interpretation during 
an objection. Because the CB’s assessment is self-defined, methodologies must be reiterated 
to the OB where there is lack of clarity. To help in interpreting this information, OBs 
frequently have or, employ, experts in fisheries management to assist in their objection. 
 
Because stock assessments can be conducted using varying methodologies, each with 
distinctive characteristics and inconstant levels of uncertainty (Patterson et al, 2001); no 
single fisheries scientist interprets or conducts stock assessments in a uniform way.  Modern 
fish stock assessments can rely on dozens, sometimes hundreds, of individual judgements 
about data usage, weighting, years to include and what conditions to assume in models (FAO, 
2006). Hilborn (2002) (himself a consultant to FCs) argues that fisheries management is often 
not transparent because so many arbitrary decisions are made in the stock assessment process.   
In the light of this, CBs are inevitably going to be required to spend time explaining areas of 
their assessment and their logic during an objection. 
 
Consequently, the efficiency of the Objections Procedure is diminished.  Even though 
assessment methodologies are made available by the CB in the Final Determination, it is 
identified by one CB that to trawl through the myriad of information presented is highly time 
consumptive.   
 
The assessment process itself may benefit from greater transparency between CBs and 
stakeholders, particularly through the data gathering and analysis stages.  By keeping 
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stakeholders well informed of the different decisions and judgements made regarding a 
fishery during assessment, issues may be resolved prior to the Final Determination, nullifying 
the need for an OP.  Such a system however may inherently be inefficient itself due to extra 
time taken in explanation during assessment. 
 
Another CB noted that the OP did appear “to produce improvements in explanation and more 
robust results”.  Judging by this comment, it is indicated that the OP itself does provide 
assessment clarification and produce a more robust outcome.  These elements could be 
clarified through the assessment process without requiring an objection.   
 
CBs also felt that the design of the OP leaves it vulnerable to “abuse” from stakeholders 
wishing to raise their profile or push an agenda.  Because the OP is intended to be conducted 
in an open and transparent manner, those wishing to view formal Objections correspondence 
between parties may do so via the MSC website (except for in the contentious objection cases 
of Alaskan Pollock and New Zealand Hoki, for which documents are only available via email 
request).  CBs suggest that the transparent nature of the OP provides a platform for people 
wishing to raise the profile of an argument, or “rally against MSC as a whole”.   
 
It is alleged that by objecting, an OB can raise the awareness of issues they feel require 
attention and publicly look to be proactive on issues of sustainability regardless of the 
outcome. One CB describes this type of behaviour stating: 
 
“An objection is very good publicity for an NGO, almost regardless of the outcome. 
Given the tendency to negotiate a settlement, the OB will typically get something 
changed – even if not methodologically warranted, so they can issue a press release 
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to highlight the change that they forced. In short, it’s good publicity for the OB 
whether they win or lose, so they may as well object – unless there is a financial 
penalty”. 
From this perspective, it seems the incentive to object is high when an organization is 
motivated by publicity, and the resource costs are small or easily satisfied.  OB comments 
regarding costs however would suggest this is rarely the case.  The use of financial restriction 
in controlling objections will be discussed later on. 
 
8.2.3 Fishery Client and the Objecting Body 
Whilst there was only one FC respondent, it is worth noting their point of view as it provides 
a greater diversity of opinion albeit a limited perspective from the industry. Also, several 
major points correspond with that of other respondents.  
 
Like the CBs, the FC identified the vulnerability to abuse from OBs as a major stumbling 
block of the OP.  
 
“The objection process gives lead to abuses from certain stakeholders who do not use 
the procedure because of genuine concerns with the assessment, but because of internal 
politics in their organisation”  
It is implied here that OBs are in some cases not wholly motivated by issues with a CBs 
assessment, but also internally motivated factors.  The exact nature of these motivations are 
not specified, however subsequent comments may allude to the context of this statement. 
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The FC was directly critical of the way they perceived that the OP empowered the Objecting 
Body during and objection.  The Objections Procedure was said to give “all the rights” to the 
OB, freeing them to “dictate procedures completely”.  In doing so, the FC felt that the OB 
was enabled to act in a way that empowered them to: 
 
“1/...throw with mud and allegations in his notice of objection 
2/ decide(s) on the way forward in the negotiation for reconciliation phase 
3/ decide(s) on the oral hearing”  
These three points provide a curious insight into the Objections Procedure.  The first focuses 
on the OB’s purported ability to “throw with mud and allegations” when filing their Notice 
of Objection (NoO).  The reference to “mud” here can only be assumed to mean the throwing 
of allegations intended to negatively impact the image of the recipient.   
 
This is interesting in that the Objections Procedure clearly states that “an objection has a 
reasonable prospect of success if, in the view of the IA......It is not spurious or vexatious” 
(MSC, 2009: Section 4.5).  By this definition, the IA will only consider the NoO valid if 
allegations are backed by relevant, authentically sourced evidence, intended not to vex or 
harass.  Therefore, any objection presented by the OB should in theory only be allowed to 
proceed if not vexatious. The OB is free however to publish further information and/or 
accusations in other media fora, allowing OBs to not only attack other organizations, but 
tarnish their public image in the process. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to determine whether NoO contain spurious or 
vexatious information; however there are clear discrepancies between what this FC considers 
unsuitable allegations for objection and the opinion of the IA.  There is room for further 
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research into the legal rights of OBs to publicly declare objection information and 
surrounding commentary, and the rights of involved parties to preserve their reputation. 
 
The second point is in reference to the reconsideration and consultation phase of the OP 
(MSC, 2009: Section 4.6).  Here, the involved parties attempt to negotiate an agreement after 
the NoO has been accepted by the IA.  The CB and FC are given an opportunity to respond to 
the NoO through the IA.  Once this has commenced, the IA consults with the FC and OB as 
to “whether the response of the Certification Body, including any proposed amendments to 
the Final Report and Determination, adequately addresses the issues raised in the NoO” 
(MSC, 2009: Pg. 5).   
 
Should the IA, in consultation with the OB, find that the CB’s response does not adequately 
address issues raised and no common ground can be found, then the “IA shall notify all 
parties that the adjudication phase will commence immediately in accordance with Section 
4.7” (MSC, 2009: Section 4.6.5).   
 
The point made by the FC implies here that the OB determines the course of the above 
process.  This appears to have merit in the sense that the OB must agree to the response to the 
NoO in order to avoid adjudication.  Should the OB not agree, the IA is required to proceed 
to adjudication as he/she has already acknowledged that the issues raised are of merit by 
accepting the NoO.   
 
An illustration of this can be seen in the case of the Suriname Atlantic Seabob Shrimp 
objection filed in December of 2009.  The OB (WWF) filed a NoO which was subsequently 
111 
 
accepted by the IA.  Following a response from the CB and a series of telephone conferences, 
the IA decided to proceed to adjudication stating: 
 
“WWF have informed me that they no longer think resolution this way is possible and 
that I should proceed to adjudication......I wish to inform all parties that I have 
therefore decided, pursuant to paragraph 4.6.5 of the Objections Procedure, to proceed 
to formal adjudication of this objection” (MSC, 2011c: Pg. 1) 
 
It is clear here that the IA acted upon the OB’s stance that no resolution could be found.  
From this perspective, the view held by the FC that the OB decides the way forward leading 
up to the adjudication stage has merit.   
This FC is critical of this type of process stating “(if) the IA has all the elements to base her 
decision upon, why should there be an oral hearing on request of the Objector?”. Essentially, 
the FC is arguing that prior to formal adjudication, all the necessary information regarding 
the fishery and objection is made available to the IA.  Should the IA have the power to rule at 
this point, the adjudication process could be avoided more frequently as IA’s could make an 
informed ruling more early on if possible.   
 
By virtue the Section 4.6-4.7 of MSC OP Methodology (MSC, 2009), the power to proceed 
to adjudication is granted to the OB only.  The FC cannot directly insist on adjudication; 
however the intent to proceed to adjudication can be provoked in the OB by simply refusing 
to address issues in the NoO. Therefore, the adequacy of the response to the NoO is not 
determined completely by the IA, but by the acceptance of the Objecting Body.  OBs 
unwilling to negotiate or accept changes outside their demands are free to instigate formal 
adjudication.  As implied previously by CBs, should the Objecting Body have alternative 
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motives for objecting, there is little preventing the objection proceeding to adjudication once 
the NoO has been accepted.   
 
This is significant in that OBs can use the OP to influence certification.  By instigating 
adjudication, OBs require the FC and CB to invest resources into an Objection.  Should the 
FC not be able to fund an objection, they may be forced to withdraw from certification all 
together, regardless of the objection’s legitimacy. 
 
The third point is difficult to substantiate as there is little documentation regarding the 
happenings in an oral hearing during adjudication.  The oral hearing is “intended to provide 
an opportunity for the Certification Body, the Objecting Body(s) and the Fishery Client(s) (if 
not the objecting party) to present their respective cases in person” (MSC, 2009: 5).  After 
seeking further clarification, the FC made it clear that they felt because the OB was in the 
offensive position during an objection, they should not have the possibility to demand an oral 
hearing.  The costs of proceeding to and beyond an oral hearing are considered great, 
particularly financially.  Because objections often address multiple areas of the assessment, it 
is often required that several members of the CB and FC attend the hearing at great financial 
cost.  As previously mentioned, if the FC cannot finance an objection, they may enter a 
position where they are forced to relinquish certification.  
 
Finally, the FC raised the issue of negative publicity.  As stated previously, the Objections 
Procedure has the potential to be a publicity arena for those wishing to express their opinion 
regarding MSC or related topics. Again, the FC felt aggrieved by the accusations of the 
Objecting Body towards itself and the CB, some of which were thought to have been 
unrelated to the assessment. 
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“(There was) a lot of negative publicity for the FC and the assessment team that was 
alleged....besides the request for rescoring” 
 
The FC seemed perturbed by the allegations raised by the OB remaining on the MSC website 
“for months” despite the FC being “completely cleared”.  It was felt that this allowed for 
“speculations and harming peoples’ and organisation’s integrity and reputation”. 
 
These statements illuminate the area of reputational risk during an Objections Procedure.  
Throughout an objection, stakeholders are able to make accusations against other parties, 
even if it is assessment related.  For example, if an OB felt that there was a conflict of interest 
with one or more of the assessment personnel then they would be entitled to raise these 
concerns directly.  However, should the allegations be found to be false, there is no 
mechanism to rectifying any reputational damage caused by harmful accusations during an 
objection.   
 
It is known by defamation law that the impact of accusations on reputation can linger past 
any vindication (Schaffer, 1990).  Therefore the FC has a legitimate case when requesting a 
mechanism that publicly clears the innocent party of wrong doing after an objection.  The 
Objections Procedure should not be a forum in which organizations can look to damage the 
reputation of another, particularly when accusations are proved false. 
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8.3 Role Satisfaction with the Independent Adjudicator 
The IA’s role involves determining the course which an objection takes, deciding the final 
ruling after adjudication.  The IA does not have the power to decline certification of a fishery; 
they are required to assess the given arguments by each stakeholder and make a decision 
whether to accept the original assessment or remand the determination to the CB.  Should the 
determination be remanded, the CB has ten days to make any changes necessary and respond 
to the IA, FC and OB.  The IA determines whether the CB’s response is an adequate 
resolution to the matters raised and approves the original/amended determination or upholds 
the objection.  All changes are written into the Final Report and Determination (MSC, 
2010b). 
 
There are notable discrepancies between the interpretations of the IA’s role amongst the 
different respondents.  OBs tended to highlight issues of process and the limitations applied 
to the IA, although some were pleased with the scope in which the IA operates.  Certification 
Bodies were more positive in their view of the IA, but noted some issues around the 
adjudication process.  The FC had mixed views and felt the IA was more effective in the pre-
adjudication stages of the Objections Procedure. 
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8.3.1 Independent Adjudicator and Objecting Body 
One OB was positive in their assessment of the IA’s role during an Objection.  They felt the 
IA was “clear and professional about his jurisdiction” and gave “clear guidance” as to the 
course of the objection. This type of action is unsurprising in that the IA is required to state 
the scope in which they are able to act and the course an objection can take in all objection 
correspondence.   
 
OBs also commented on the ‘balance’ they felt the IA brought to the Objections Procedure 
Stating: 
 
“(the IA) played a clear role in balancing the table to give our concerns more power 
and importance than was given before by the CB and FC” 
 
The above statement gives an interesting position on ‘balance’.  It is implied here the IA was 
necessary to increase the significance of the OB’s position to that given by the CB and FC.  
In this respect the OB indicates a position of disempowerment at the hands of the CB and FC 
without the IA’s input. From this OBs’ point of view, the IA empowers them to raise issues 
that must be satisfied, even if dismissed by the CB or FC.  This of course is a primary reason 
for having an IA and validates the need for the OP to be facilitated by an independent expert 
who is capable of mediating such a process.  Without an IA, there would be a real risk of 
legitimate issues having their significance reduced.  
 
Those OBs concerned with the IA’s role were particularly focussed on the scope in which the 
IA operates.  Because the IA cannot rule a fishery unsuitable for certification, it was thought 
the IA’s “purview is too limited” and the OP is more a “matter of process” on the way to 
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certification rather than an arena where valid concerns prevent certification.  This is 
highlighted by the fact only one objection has ever been overturned completely (Faroese 
Mackerel), a fishery perceived to be “particularly egregious” by OBs.  One OB illustrated 
this type of experience stating: 
 
“it seemed unless we could prove that the CB said that the sky was green, we’d be 
unable to succeed in our arguments” 
 
Much of the frustration expressed here was preceded with distaste in how the IA and CB 
dealt with the uncertainty surrounding a fishery in many objection cases.  All objections 
considered in this study have disputed the handling of data uncertainty to some extent.  
Whilst fisheries science is never exact and inherently contains uncertainty (FAO, 2006), OBs 
felt that “it is too easy for Certifiers to make a plausible argument” in the “face of 
uncertainty”. 
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to judge the handling of data uncertainty issues by an 
IA, however there have been cases where the CB has changed PI scores after the initial 
determination was remanded due to uncertainty.  None of these has resulted in certification 
being blocked.   
 
An example of this can be found during the Ross Sea Toothfish objection (2009-2010) where 
the OB claimed that a precautionary approach to quantitative uncertainty was not adhered to, 
a claim that the IA in part agreed with stating: 
 
117 
 
“To my mind, the score is not justified by the evidence on the Record and I would 
remand this PISG (Performance Indicator Scoring Guidepost) to the CB for further 
consideration” (MSC, 2010d) 
 
The CB responded by defending their position to the IA, finally concluding with the 
statement:  
 
“We therefore maintain that the results of monitoring are quantitatively evaluated 
against precautionary target and limit reference points on a regular and timely basis. 
We therefore propose ‘no change’ to the score for this PI. 
 
The IA responded by upholding their position in part stating: “I consider that the further 
explanation provided by MML (CB) at (b) is adequate to respond to the remand”, however 
subsequent elements of the fishery were not agreed to: “In these circumstances, it is illogical 
to award a theoretically ‘perfect’ score of 100. No reasonable CB could award such a score 
on the evidence available to it and, for this reason, the score of 100 cannot be justified” 
(MSC, 2010h).  Despite the position of the IA and OBs, the Toothfish was certified on 
November 16 2010. 
 
As previously mentioned, OBs consider the manner in which the CB can justify their position 
in the face of uncertainty to be too easy.  The above example may illustrate this.  Because 
fisheries data can be highly dubious, MSC may benefit from a more robust way of handling 
this data.  In July 2009 MSC released its Risk Based Framework which defines how data 
limited fisheries are to be assessed.  The impact of this framework is yet to be assessed; 
however it is only enacted where a fishery is data deficient.  Should there be adequate data; 
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the default assessment process is used which requires uncertainty be ‘accounted’ for (MSC, 
2010b).  Because all fisheries data contains varying degrees of uncertainty, MSC may benefit 
from more solid and well defined guidelines surrounding its use. 
 
8.3.2 Independent Adjudicator and Certification Body 
Comments by CBs regarding the IA tended to focus on the “application of methodology” and 
its subsequent impact on the OP itself.  The IA’s role was seen as one that was required to 
mediate and apply the Objections Methodology during an objection.   The application of 
methodology was regarded as a “good thing” as many of the objections was seen to have 
often boiled down to “technical issues – and perspectives / opinions”.  Additionally, One CB 
noted a tendency to “err on the side of caution and spend time dealing with issues which had 
not material effect on the outcome of the case” (sic).  
 
This appreciation for the way in which the IA applies the Objections Methodology in one 
sense is unsurprising.  The CB is required to assess a fishery in accordance with the MSC 
Fishing Assessment Methodology (FAM) which is a highly technical and prescriptive method 
of assessment.  The purpose of an objection is to bring to attention any mistakes that would 
make a material difference to the assessment within the MSC FAM framework.  Therefore, if 
a CB assesses a fishery and applies MSC’s FAM justifiably, it is difficult to dispute 
certification, regardless of whether the OB feels the CB made a mistake in the assessment.  
Highleyman (2004) identifies and is critical of this in his report stating: 
 
“CBs have too much flexibility determining how principles and criteria are applied, including 
the thresholds for compliance, allowing for inconsistencies and low thresholds” 
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This theme can be observed in the Aker Biomarine Krill objection where the Antarctic and 
Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) objected to the Antarctic Krill  fishery being certified 
primarily on the grounds that the certification of one boat could not represent the 
sustainability of an entire fishery.  The IA concluded: 
 
“However logical this may appear at first blush, it does not comport with the terms of 
the MSC principles” (MSC, 2010j: Pg. 5) 
 
This is an example where an OB has objected on grounds that could be given considerable 
merit outside the MSC principles. However because the IA must stick to the MSC FAM and 
its technical prescriptions, the objection was overturned as the primary issue raised regarded 
MSC’s principles rather than the assessment itself. 
 
There were also themes raised concerning issues of competency with the IA and their 
understanding of technical information.  IAs are required by MSC to “have demonstrated 
expertise in one or more of the following areas”: 
 
 Jurisprudence. 
 Fisheries Law. 
 Dispute resolution and/or mediation preferably related to natural resource 
management. 
(MSC, 2011d) 
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One CB was “not convinced the adjudicator was competent to understand fully the issues”. 
The reasons for this are not given, however it could be argued that the expertise required of 
an IA is sometimes not concurrent with all of the issues tackled.   
 
Whilst each IA undoubtedly has expertise in one or more of the described areas, the issues 
addressed in an objection often are highly technical and require detailed knowledge of 
fisheries science and stock behaviour ecology, something not required of an MSC IA 
specifically.  
This is significant in that an IA should be competent in the areas being adjudicated.  It is 
somewhat surprising that an IA is not required to have any fisheries science expertise.  It is a 
clear indication that MSC sees the OP as more of a legal process than scientific disagreement, 
a direction that is risky.  It is acknowledged adjudicators cannot have expertise in all areas, 
however when adjudicating issues concerning fisheries sustainability it would seem logical to 
require competence in fisheries science. 
Science works well with defined questions, objectives and testing (Bair, 2001).  Where 
scientific studies are at the centre of lawsuits, law and science attempt to merge, often 
creating conflict. Conflicts arise when scientific methods are portrayed to legal experts.  The 
credibility, methods, and analysis of experts can be questioned, and scientific terms are used 
in a legal context (Loth, 1986). Adjudicators and jurors can be swayed by the personalities of 
the experts more so than by the facts and opinions that the experts present (Bair, 2001).  
Legal process is primarily geared to conflict resolution and therefore may be less concerned 
about identifying an underlying or global truth, as it is framed in the scientific process 
(Hughes, 1999). By taking this approach, there is the real danger of silencing scientific truth 
amongst the mire of legal process.  
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8.3.3 Independent Adjudicator and Fishery Client 
The sole responding FC displayed mixed views towards the IA’s role in the Objection 
Process.  They were generally “satisfied” with the IA’s role, primarily because their 
objection was successful. 
 
Dissatisfaction stemmed from the role of the IA prior to the adjudication phase.  In line with 
previous comments by CBs, the FC expressed distaste for the scope the IA is permitted 
leading up to adjudication and the ability of an IA to make a decision prior to this phase. 
 
(The Objections Procedure) “leaves too limited scope for the IA to move and make 
decisions prior to the expensive oral hearing” 
 
As discussed previously, the OB has the potential to determine whether an objection should 
proceed to adjudication.  This is something that requires attention as it may empower OBs to 
impose the financial burdens of an Objection onto smaller, less resourced fisheries, 
potentially requiring them to withdraw from certification. 
 
8.4 Objections Costs and Barriers to Participation 
One area of great contention and a source of diverse opinion was the issue of who should pay 
for and objection and whether the costs represent a barrier to participation. 
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8.4.1 Objections Cost and the Objecting Body 
There were three primary themes identified regarding the issues of who should pay for an 
objection.   These were: 
 
1. MSC should pay. 
2. Payments should be dependent on merit. 
3. The OB should pay. 
 
Those who felt the MSC should pay for the objection approached their conclusion from a 
legitimacy point of view.  Their reasoning was that the OP provided a way in which the MSC 
assessment could be transparently evaluated, providing an arena for legitimate issues to be 
resolved, validating the transparent nature of MSC certification. 
 
It was considered that the objections fee provided a “severe impediment to lodging an 
objection”.  By presenting a barrier to objection, there is a “direct impact on access and thus 
legitimacy of the MSC process”.  Where potential OBs are prevented from objecting due to 
costs, an assessment is considered to not have been robustly evaluated because all concerns 
have not been adequately addressed. 
 
From this angle, it can be interpreted that the financial burden of an objection should be 
MSC’s responsibility to pay in order to ensure its credibility as a transparent eco-label.   
 
Whilst there is clearly merit in MSC financing an objection, the application of such a system 
may prove challenging.  MSC is an independent, non-profit organization.   Reallocating the 
financial burden of an objection from OBs to MSC has the likely outcome of MSC having to 
123 
 
raise the licencing cost of its label.  In doing so, the price of MSC certified seafood may 
increase further, restricting consumers to those who can afford the greater expense and 
causing all consumers to more carefully weigh the sustainability benefits against the financial 
costs of MSC products.  Because the success of the MSC label is determined by its market 
share, such an effect could undermine MSC’s effectiveness. 
 
The second notion, that payment should be dependent on merit, stems from the fact that a 
NoO can only be accepted if the IA determines that the arguments presented are valid and 
require further investigation.  Therefore, should an objection be accepted by the IA, MSC 
should cover the cost of the objection as it is  
“in MSC’s best interests” to “ensure that its label is being appropriately applied”. 
 
Similar to the idea that MSC should pay, MSC would be exempt from paying for 
unsuccessful objections.  This type of structure is logical in theory; however there is scope for 
illicit use.  Because the requirement for MSC to pay for an objection shifts from the 
occasional fee waiver to paying every accepted objection, the criteria for an objection to be 
allowed to be accepted could be influenced in a way that favours not allowing objections.  
MSC could be incentivised to reduce the number of objections allowed in order to contain 
costs.  Such an action would directly threaten the legitimacy of the MSC label. 
 
Thirdly, one Objecting Body agreed with the current system where the OB pays a fee for the 
right to object.  This notion was condoned on the basis that the fee waiver option remains 
available.  According to the MSC Objections Methodology, OBs can apply for a fee waiver 
under exceptional circumstances (MSC, 2010d: Sec 4.10.5). Considering many ENGO’s are 
often donation funded, poverty would likely not be an exceptional circumstance. Therefore 
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the definition of ‘exceptional circumstance’ requires clarification by MSC in order to 
formally outline what this means for Objectors.  
 
8.4.2 Objections Cost and the Certification Body 
There were two notable themes to emerge from the views of the CBs regarding the costs of 
an objection.  The first was that the cost responsibility should be outcome dependent, the 
second that OBs should bear the financial burden.  
 
The idea of outcome dependent payment determination follows the logic that the validated 
party should not be responsible for the objection costs as they have proved an objection is 
necessary.   
 
“(if) an Objector puts in an objection which ultimately results in little or no change – 
they should pay and pay costs to the Client. However, if the objection has merit and 
results in significant change, or a change in outcome, then the Client should cover their 
own costs and the cost of the Certification Body” 
 
It is interesting here that the CB feels that it would be the responsibility of the FCs to cover 
the CB’s costs in this circumstance.  Considering the CB would have carried out the 
assessment, and all objections seek to question the assessment itself, one might conclude that 
any mistake made would likely be the fault of the CB, having little to do with the FC.  
Additionally, CBs previously argued that the costs of an objection were a disincentive to 
small scale fisheries to apply for MSC certification. CBs appear here to consider their role 
purely as an assessment body, acting on behalf of the FC, devoid of consequence when fault 
is found. 
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An outcome-based fee system would provide a different set of considerations for any ‘would 
be’ OB.  The likelihood of success could become crucial as OBs seek to avoid paying for 
objection costs.  At the current success rate for an OB, this type of change could ultimately 
discourage objections being filed.  However, the current rate of OB success is so low that 
most OBs are required to seriously count this cost regardless of outcome. 
 
Discouraging objections via a compulsory fee is further pushed by the remaining themes 
presented by Certifiers. CBs felt that the objection fee kept potential OBs in check, reducing 
the filed objections to those who were more serious about objecting and had substantial 
resources. 
 
“By allowing OBs to object without financial risk or penalty, there is no disincentive to 
object, and objections become more frequent and opportunistic. If an NGO doesn’t 
have to pay to object, and they have a salaried member of staff who can do so, then why 
not object? Even if they only want a small change”. 
The use of a fee for OBs certainly provides a disincentive to object as one must weigh the 
marginal benefits against the marginal costs of objecting.  However, as previously identified 
by OBs, the fee and its size determines which organizations(s) have the capacity to object, 
regardless of the merit their case has. Frequently OBs are NGO’s and non-profit 
organizations with a limited ability to allocate funding to an objection, especially at short 
notice.  Eliminating or reducing the objections fee would open the door to smaller 
organizations that wish to object but are restrained by the actual and opportunity costs of 
objection. As pointed out, any such action will also provide an opportunity for those who 
wish to abuse the objections system to do so by presenting frivolous cases.  
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CBs also indicated that they felt the OP was open to abuse without an objections fee from 
OBs seeking publicity.  
“An objection is very good publicity for an NGO, almost regardless of the outcome..... 
In short, it’s good publicity for the OB whether they win or lose, so they may as well 
object – unless there is a financial penalty” 
It is common for OBs to release a statement online after filing an objection and to keep its 
readers up to date with the objection happenings.  Occasionally there are articles presented in 
other fora e.g. newspapers, blogs, magazines. As previously identified, an objection can be a 
form of protest in that the OBs make their view known publicly challenging the actions and 
views of another body.  There is scope for an OB to pursue an objection with the goal of 
reputational gain and positive publicity.  An objections fee may in part moderate this type of 
effect; however it is unlikely to prevent publicity itself being a motivating factor in an 
objection.   
Should an OB be motivated by publicity, only controls on an organization’s ability to 
publicise objection happenings can provide barriers to objections with little merit.  
Restrictions surrounding press releases and dates in which organizations can make 
information available are examples of these types of controls. Such controls however would 
provide barriers to the openness and transparency MSC strives to maintain.  The maintenance 
of transparency standards in eco-labelling is seen as essential in maintaining credibility 
amongst consumers and reducing trade frictions (Ward, 1997).  Limiting the availability of 
information to the consumer regarding any objection could provide a wall behind which those 
wishing to keep sensitive information out of the public fora could hide information.  Such an 
occurrence would be in violation of the FAO’s Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 
1995), a Code in which MSC’s values are based upon. 
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8.4.3 Objections Cost and the Fishery Client 
The perspective provided by the FC was not dissimilar to the CB, yet with unique attributes.  
Two themes emerged from the data: 1. the FC alludes to the notion that the OB should pay 
for the objection, 2. the costs to the FC are already high and could require a FC to abandon 
certification should they be required to pay for an objection. 
 
The FC was quick to identify the costs to itself despite the objection fee being paid by the 
OB.  It was felt that the consequences of having to pay for an objection would have resulted 
in the FC abandoning certification without challenging the objection. 
“the....... fishery would NOT have been able to pay all the costs the objection brought 
along.  The fishery would have been forced to stop the assessment, giving in to the OB’s 
requirements, and not have had the chance to win the objection and be certified” 
As previously noted the FC is required to cover their own associated costs (e.g. staff, travel, 
accommodation) when attending adjudication meetings and preparing objection statements.  
These costs can be great when considering most travel is international and each meeting can 
take days to conclude.  Therefore it is understandable that some FCs would struggle to meet 
the financial burden of an objection.  Should the FC have to pay for the objection, it may 
indeed cause some to pull out of certification without challenging the Objecting Body.  
 
This problem is the reverse of the OBs’ point of view which seeks to put the costs of an 
objection on the FC and/or CB.  Whilst this may enable smaller organizations with legitimate 
cases to object, FCs unable to bear the cost can be pushed out of certification.  This type of 
arrangement leaves room for OBs to ‘bully’ smaller fisheries into abandoning certification. 
This is problematic as small scale fisheries tend to be more sustainable than larger fisheries 
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(Jacquet & Pauly, 2007). Any seafood eco-label seeking to promote sustainability needs to be 
able to attract small scale as well as large scale participants. 
 
8.4.4 Barrier to Participation 
 
When respondents were asked whether they considered the objections fee as a barrier to 
participation, there were two polar themes identified.  The OBs were primarily of the opinion 
that the objections fee limited the ability of an organization to object, whilst the CBs and FC 
felt strongly that there was no such effect. 
 
OBs allege that “Stakeholder involvement is stifled by costs of participation”.  This was said 
to be further exacerbated by the fact that OBs “rarely win”.  OBs are required to “weigh their 
odds of a successful objection (unlikely in the MSC process) against the fee” before pursuing 
an objection.  This is an obvious barrier to participation in that OBs must first gather the 
finances to cover an objection and consider whether the cost is worth losing an objection for.  
Despite this, some organizations “still feel obligated to object rather than let certifications 
proceed unchallenged”.   
 
One OB noted that in addition to the financial cost of the OP, there were also additional costs 
of “complexity, length and frustration of the (objections) process” which provides further 
barriers to participation.   
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The CBs perceived the ability of stakeholders to object to be well within their capacity, and 
that the various costs of an objection appeared not to hinder OBs pursuing an objection. 
“NGO stakeholders seem very keen to use expensive legal-type processes” and “most 
objections come in from organisations with plenty of money and salaried individuals 
able to spend time on it” 
This is an insightful perception, and gives evidence for OB’s argument that small or poor 
organizations truly cannot object.  Because objections do present a significant cost, 
participating OBs can be filtered down to those with a large resource base or an ability to 
raise resources.  In doing so, an impression may be given that NGO stakeholders who chose 
to object are well resourced in most cases.  The question in this scenario is how many 
objections have not occurred due to the financial costs involved? This is needs further study. 
CBs also identify a significant issue faced by the FC with regards to an objection and its 
associated costs.  CBs feel that the cost of an objection “ironically limits the certification to 
big industrial fisheries” by requiring the FC to weigh the costs of certification and potential 
objection against the benefits of certification.  Again, CBs argue that the Objections 
Procedure itself may be restricting small scale fisheries from applying for MSC certification. 
 
“The current situation means that the cost of an objection could exceed the cost of an 
assessment - even where the objection does not result in a material change (i.e the CB 
reached the correct conclusion in the first place).  This is clearly crazy and is a further 
disincentive for small scale fisheries to enter the MSC scheme” 
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These comments are further supported by those of the FC.  When asked if the costs of an 
objection limited the OBs participation, they replied: 
 
“NO, this amount is peanuts compared to what costs are involved for the fishery/FC 
concerned” 
 
Clearly the costs of the Objections Procedure to the FC and CB are considered significant.  
The FC has the most to lose in that if an objection cannot be challenged, then certification 
would need to be withdrawn after already paying for the assessment to be completed.  The 
CB has the reputation of its assessments to defend, something that future FCs will consider 
when selecting a CB.  From this view point, the costs of an objection are initially greater for 
the OB, yet at its conclusion the OB can claim accolades regardless of the outcome.  The 
costs applied to the CB and FC will almost certainly be a factor in the decision to seek 
certification. 
 
8.5 Improvements to the Objections Procedure 
Respondents were forthcoming when asked to comment on potential improvements to the 
Objections Procedure.  A diversity of answers were given, many contrasting with the others 
and providing a unique insight into the interactions between stakeholders. 
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8.5.1 Objection Fee 
The “elimination” of an objection fee was solely identified by OBs.  Two considered such a 
move would bring improvement to the OP.  Interestingly there was an acknowledgement of 
the costs to the FC also.  Not only was there a plug to remove the objections fee, but also “the 
costs to industry of the MSC certification”.  This statement may indicate some form of sympathy 
towards the industry and the cost burden incurred during an objection.  Additionally, it also indicates 
a view that costs should be applied to the CB. 
 
8.5.2 Independent Adjudicator 
The OBs and FC proposed several changes to the use and role of the IA.  Three OBs were of 
the view that the IA could not be truly independent unless “not selected and employed by the 
MSC”.  Currently the IA’s are selected by MSC and changed every three years. During this 
time they are contracted and paid by MSC.  This arrangement has led some OBs to identify 
potential principal-agent issues, with the IA being incentivised to provide a good record of 
certification for its MSC employer.  As a result, the OBs were of the opinion that the IA 
should be employed by an independent body.  
 
Furthermore, IA’s were seen by one OB to primarily be “legal experts” and not “qualified to 
adjudicate substantive matters of sustainability”.  As mentioned previously, IA’s are selected 
based on three potential areas of expertise: 1. Jurisprudence 2. Fisheries law 3. Dispute 
resolution and/or mediation preferably related to natural resource management.  From these 
criteria, it is evident that expertise in fisheries science is not a prerequisite in IA selection.  
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The selection criteria do indicate a perception by MSC of the OP to be a legal type process 
requiring legal expertise, rather than an objective forum for scientific debate requiring 
expertise in fisheries science.   
 
The question in this instance becomes is the OP an application of process or mediation of 
debate?  The former would be suited to individuals who have expert experience in legal 
matters as they are attuned to applying rules.  Should the latter be the case, expertise in rule 
application and process is required; however a good understanding of the science would also 
be necessary to make any informed rulings and to communicate clearly with stakeholders.  
One CB suggests the Objections Procedure is currently treated as a quasi-legal process 
stating: 
 
Any method which avoids a legal-type approach would be an improvement in my 
opinion:”......“the current approach will never be efficient (and alarmingly has 
required personal attendance of people at hearings in some cases)”. 
Instead of an OP, it is suggested that a “more in-depth peer review process would be a better 
approach (e.g. a panel of 3 independent assessors with relevant technical knowledge)”. This 
is similar to the “Appeals Panel” approach used by the Forest Stewardship Council which is 
“comprised of (sic) one to three persons that are impartial and free of any conflict of interest 
in relation to the appellant and to the appeal” (FSC, 2009. Sec. 4.2) and is consensus based 
in its ruling. The advantage in this is that panel members can apply a more diverse 
background in experience when assessing an appeals’ merit and to allow for debate amongst 
members.  However the difficulty in finding individuals qualified to conduct such reviews 
consistently and independently is challenging (Deep Sea News, 2008) and likely to be incur 
greater costs. 
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The FC was supportive of the IA being empowered to decide an objections direction and 
outcome earlier on in an objection.  The FC believes that the IA should have the authority, 
and be motivated to “drop or sustain points in the objection at that moment (moment of 
objection)”.   
 
Additionally, it is felt that the decision to proceed to an oral hearing “should be up to the 
FC/fishery to decide” and the “initiative should NOT be left to the OB”.   
 
Their reasoning follows the logic that if “the IA has all the elements to base her decision 
upon, why should there be an oral hearing on request of the OB?”.  This idea is further 
supported by one CB who felt that “most issues can (be) dismissed out-of-hand, but take time 
and resources to deal with”. 
 
As previously mentioned, should the OB conclude that their concerns have not been 
adequately addressed and recommend proceeding to formal adjudication, then the IA has 
little power to deny this request.  From this perspective, the OP is very process driven.  
Should the IA already know their position regarding issues raised, then there is logical reason 
to contend that the IA should have the power to determine a ruling prior to adjudication 
provided the IA felt that all information and opinions had been expressed.  This type of 
change may reduce the number and scopes of objections filed and reduce overall costs as 
formal adjudication would be necessary less frequently. 
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8.5.3 Methodology and Reporting 
Respondents suggested improving the Objections Procedure methodologies and the way in which data 
and actions are reported.  One CB was concerned with the complexity of the Objections Procedure 
despite the methodology being simplified in 2010.  The changes made are acknowledged to make it 
“much easier and transparent to explain a certification”, however there is an expressed 
concern that complexity is returning, although what is considered complex is not defined.   
The primary issue is that “complexity results in errors”, and consequentially an “increasing 
likelihood that fisheries will fail or objections will be upheld due to technical mistakes in the 
methodology, rather than because the fishery does not meet the MSC principles fisheries”.   
OBs are indeed able to object on grounds that the CB made one or more mistakes in their application 
of MSC assessment methodology.  Because of the process-based nature of MSC certification, one 
significant mistake can block certification if objected to and if the objection is upheld as a significant 
error.  Determining which methodological mistakes are significant and which are trivial becomes the 
issue.  The answer to this question is then part of the decision making by the IA. 
 
In addition, it was indicated by one CB that the way in which MSC reports its objections proceedings 
and assessment process requires further attention.  The summary report released by MSC contains 
much of the assessment documentation including stakeholder submissions and the final report.  The 
size of the MSC summary reports are said to make “it almost impossible for anyone without 
enormous amounts of free time to follow what went on”.  This type of reporting is thorough 
yet difficult to synthesise efficiently.  Those wishing to look at criteria used by the CB and 
the process followed are required to trawl through what can be hundreds of pages of 
documentation.  It is felt by the CB that many “issues can be dealt with by improving clarity 
in reporting, well defined forms of evidence and improved scoping (what falls within MSC 
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requirements)”.  By having a more succinct form of reporting, issues with assessment 
methodology and application may become less frequent as the outline of what has occurred 
becomes more accessible.  
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9.0 Summary & Conclusions 
The results of this study have illuminated many of the inner workings of an MSC objection and 
revealed major areas of contention amongst actors.  It is clear that the structure of the MSC 
Objections Procedure has shaped the way in which actors behave during an objection and the course 
the objection takes.  It has been identified that the Objections Procedure is an important component of 
MSC’s assessment process, helping to maintain transparency and to ensure certified fisheries have 
satisfied all the MSC requirements of a sustainable fishery.  However significant issues and areas of 
concern have been identified that threaten may the credibility of MSC’s reputation and endanger the 
legitimacy of the Objections Procedure. 
 
9.1 Inter-organizational Dynamics 
The structure of the MSC OP creates incentives and motivations within actors, defining their position.  
The CB is required to approach an objection from a defensive point of view, rather than one that seeks 
to improve the sustainability of fisheries.  In doing so, the MSC Objections Procedure inhibits the 
willingness of CBs to reason with the OBs case, regardless of its legitimacy.   
 
The MSC Objections Procedure could be greatly improved by nurturing an Objections environment 
that motivated its actors to behave in a way that required improved fisheries sustainability remain the 
primary objective. 
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9.2 Principal Agent-Issues 
The questionnaire data clearly highlights principal-agent issues within the MSC structure that directly 
affect the OP.  MSC ratification of selected CBs that FCs may choose to assess their fishery 
immediately incentivises CBs to try and gain favour with MSC which may require CBs to be 
generous in their certifications.  Because FCs pays the CB to conduct an assessed, and is instructed by 
MSC to find a CB whom will give value for money, the FC is incentivised to hire a comparatively 
cheap CB with a record favourable to the FC.  This further incentivises the CB to remain competitive 
by assessing favourably unless a fishery is blatantly unworthy of certification.   
 
The clear possibility of principal-agent issues in the MSC’s structure directly influences the MSC OP. 
The current relationship and incentive structure between FC, MSC and CB requires revision in order 
to maintain transparency and integrity in its label. 
 
9.3 An Inefficient Process 
The technical prescriptions and explanation of assessment details during and Objection cause 
it to appear inefficient.  Explanations of stock assessment, particularly to individuals and IA’s 
are who are not fisheries experts require large amounts of time and resource invested on the 
part of the CB.  Many of the technical issues of an objection could be clarified in a modified 
assessment process, requiring assessors to be more thorough in the reporting of their 
assessment methodology to stakeholders.     
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9.4 Transparency; MSC’s Strength or Weakness? 
The MSC OP is a key component in maintaining a transparent eco-labelling system.  However this 
study has found that there is scope for OBs to use the OP as a means of self-promotion.  Publicly 
released criticisms by OBs have the ability to remain in the public psyche long after an objections 
conclusion, regardless of their vindication.  Therefore, regardless of whether an OB is successful in 
their objection or not, long lasting damage can be inflicted to an opponent’s public image.  Therefore 
the OP is open to abuse by OBs with the resources and motivation to use an objection in order to 
harm a target organizations reputation.   
 
Aside from the financial burden of an objection, OBs do not experience many further consequences 
from objecting.  Because small changes are frequently made in an objection, OBs are able to claim 
moral victory regardless of the overall outcome.   
 
Measures to control such effects may include further financial penalties and restrictions on 
interactions with media and social networking.  The legal legitimacy and benefit of such a move 
requires further research. 
 
9.5 Determining an Objections Direction? 
 If the OB is not satisfied that the CB has addressed the issues raised at the oral hearing stage, they 
may request adjudication.  Because the IA can only prevent adjudication where all issues have been 
addressed, the IA is almost always obliged to accept the OBs request.  Because the Objections 
Procedure requires significant financial expenditure by the FC, the OB has the potential to force the 
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withdrawal of smaller fisheries from the MSC programme by Objecting.  In order to prevent OBs 
forcing adjudication, the FC suggests that the IA should be empowered to make the decision to 
proceed if all information has been made available.  The position of the FC has merit and should be 
investigated by MSC. 
 
9.6 Independent Adjudicator Gives Balance 
This study found the IA to give balance to an Objection, particularly with regards to the position of 
the OB.  The IA gave weight to issues raised by OBs, even when such issues were dismissed by the 
CB or FC.  The IA’s role is essential in maintaining a focus on issues raised during an objection and 
ensuring such issues are addressed adequately in the judgement of the IA. 
 
9.7 Independent Adjudicator’s Purview too limited 
Because the IA cannot rule a fishery unsuitable for certification, the scope in which the IA can act 
during an objection is very limited.  Unless an assessment has made a particularly poor judgment, the 
IA is permitted by MSC rules to prevent certification.  The IA can only remand the assessment back 
to the CB to make any recommended revisions.  Because the IA cannot rule on an assessments 
agreement with the MSC Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing, it is easy for CBs to justify 
their position as they define the scoring criteria for the assessment.  
 
The results of this study suggest it may be beneficial for the IA be given the power to uphold or turn 
down an assessment earlier on in the objection, particularly where the IA considers the OB to have a 
legitimate case.   
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9.8 Objection Payment Responsibility 
When discussing who should be responsible for an objection, OBs proposed three positions: 1. MSC 
should pay for the objection. 2. Payment should depend on whether the IA agrees that the issues 
raised require by the OB are worth investigating. 3. One OB agreed with the current framework where 
the OB pays.   
 
CBs proposed that the objections payment should either be outcome dependent, where payment is the 
OB’s responsibility if an objection is unsuccessful and the CB’s responsibility if an objection is 
successful.  The FC was of the opinion that the OBs should pay for an objection.  CBs and FC both 
felt that the objections fee is a way to mediate the legitimacy of an objection and to limit objections to 
those who have legitimate motivations. 
 
Each contributors view had merit in some context. However, it was most clear that there are real 
dangers of creating perverse incentives through the responsibility of an objections payment.  A 
thorough, independent review of the Objections fee system is required in order to help determine a 
more robust financing system. 
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9.9 Objection Fee: a Barrier to Participation? 
Objectors 
OBs considered the objections fee to stifle the participation by eliminating the potential of those 
stakeholders with few resources to object.  This is said to be exacerbated by the fact the OBs rarely 
win an objection; causing would be OBs to weigh the financial costs against the benefits of objecting.   
 
The position of OBs has legitimacy and demands further research into how many would be OBs have 
decided against objecting due to objection costs. 
Certification Body’s 
CBs felt that the objections costs did not seem to prevent organizations objecting at all and that the 
publicity gains of an objection were often a motivation for OBs.  CBs also point out that the costs of 
participating in an objection to the FC have the potential to limit MSC certification to large scale 
fisheries able to finance such a process. 
 
Further research into the way in which the costs of an objection may prevent small scale fisheries 
applying for certification is required 
Fishery Client 
The FC was of the view that the OB should pay.  The FC considered the objections fee to be small in 
comparison to the costs incurred by the FC’s during an objection. 
 
Further research into the costs of an objection applied to a FC and its impact on the FCs motivation to 
seek certification is required. 
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9.10 Suggested Improvements 
Three OBs were of the opinion that a removal of the objections fee would be an improvement to the 
Objections Procedure.  However, OBs did recognise the significant cost to the FC during certification 
and an objection, encouraging MSC to address these issues of cost.  OBs and the FC indicate that they 
feel IA should not be employed by MSC as this implies principal agent-issues. They suggest that the 
IA should be employed through an independent body, removing any employer influence when 
considering fishery certification.   
 
One CB considered the quasi-legal approach of the OP to be inappropriate for matters of 
sustainability, leading to inefficient outcomes.  It suggested that an in-depth peer-review type process 
would be a better approach. 
 
A review of the goals of an objection and whether the current process type is appropriate is required.  
Additionally, consideration of a more in-depth and independent system of objecting is merited. 
 
The FC was supportive of increasing the scope in which the IA could operate, allowing IA’s to drop 
or sustain points in an objection as they see appropriate.  Additionally, it was considered that the IA 
should be able allow or decline certification. 
The FC suggests increasing the scope of the IA’s purview to include the ability to reject or accept 
certification at their discretion would improve the OP. 
 
Finally, CBs felt that reporting methods could be improved greatly.  Currently reporting of 
methodology and assessment is presented in large documents which require great amounts of time to 
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read.  Simplifying reporting could increase the understanding of assessments and reduce the 
occurrence of objections. However, maintaining transparency and communicating holistic information 
whilst trying to achieve simplicity in reporting is difficult.  An Investigation into to communicating 
simplified yet transparent methodological reporting requires further research. 
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Appendix 
1. Full list of key findings by Highleyman (2004) 
 
7. MSC’s claim of certifying sustainable fisheries in most cases is not justified under the 
definition established by its standards, the Principles and Criteria; 
8. Principle 2 requires fishing operations to maintain the structure, productivity, function, and 
diversity of the eco-system on which the fishery depends, but routinely is not met.  MSC has a 
leadership opportunity to drive best practices towards eco-system based management; 
9. Principle 3 does not require fisheries management systems to be in compliance with national 
laws.  Fisheries that are not in compliance with the law can be, and have been certified; 
10. MSC has narrowly interpreted the meaning of controversial fisheries in ways that reduces its 
flexibility and ability to guide its own future; 
11. Certifiers have too much flexibility determining how principles and criteria are applied, 
including the thresholds for compliance, allowing for inconsistencies and low thresholds.  
Recognising this, MSC is taking steps to propose greater interpretation and guidance to 
certifiers; 
12. MSC is not yet considered as a credible consortium organization because key environmental 
stakeholders do not feel that the MSC mission includes them in a substantive way; 
13. MSC has made important decisions in the in the last two years to increase stakeholder 
representation on the board but must continue this trend to restore the organization’s 
credibility; 
14. As one of the few non-governmental, multi-stakeholder organizations in the oceans policy 
arena, MSC has huge potential to become a convener of diverse interests that craft solutions 
to difficult issues. However, by not placing enough emphasis on consensus building, MSC 
had at the time currently missed the opportunity; 
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15. Staff leadership must continue to push to convene stakeholders, seeking consensus, and 
implement solutions as top priorities. 
 
2. Questionnaire Templates 
2A. Certification Body 
1. Please state which MSC objection(s) you have been involved in: 
 
2. Of the MSC objection(s) you have been involved with that have proceeded to full 
certification, have you been involved in a re-objection during re-certification? 
 
3. Overall, how would you rate your experience with the MSC objection process? 
□ Very Good – I am very pleased with how the MSC objections process proceeded and 
feel it led to legitimate outcomes 
□ Good – Overall I am pleased with how the objections process proceeded.  I only 
harbour minor issues with the MSC objections process 
□ Neutral – I am neither pleased nor displeased with how the MSC objections 
procedure operates 
□ Mixed – I am pleased with certain elements of the MSC objections process, and 
displeased with others 
□ Bad – I am displeased with how the MSC objections process proceeds and feel it 
requires improvement 
□ Very Bad – I believe the MSC objections process is flawed and leads to illegitimate 
outcomes 
4. Please elaborate on and explain your answer in the previous question 
 
5. During the MSC objection you have been involved with, were you satisfied with the role the 
Independent Adjudicator played? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    X Not satisfied     □       Very un-satisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
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6. Please explain your previous answer 
 
7. When putting forth your arguments and evidence during the objections process, how would 
you rate the level of consideration given to your arguments and evidence by the 
Independent Adjudicator? 
□ Very Good – I am of the opinion that complete consideration was given to my 
arguments and evidence by the Independent Adjudicator within the parameters of 
the MSC objections procedure 
□ Good – I am of the opinion that consideration was given to the majority of my 
arguments and evidence by the Independent Adjudicator 
□ Neutral – I am of the opinion that the consideration given to my arguments and 
evidence by the Independent Adjudicator was neither good nor bad 
□ Mixed – There were incidents where I felt that more consideration could have been 
given to my evidence and arguments, but not all the time 
□ Bad – I am of the opinion that more consideration should have been given to my 
arguments and evidence by the Independent Adjudicator 
□ Very Bad – I am of the opinion that a lot more consideration could have been given 
to my arguments and evidence 
8. Are you satisfied with the weighting given to your arguments and evidence by the 
Independent Adjudicator? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    X   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
9.  Please explain you previous answer 
 
10. During the objection(s) you were involved in, were you satisfied with the level of 
consideration the objecting body’s case was given by the Independent Adjudicator? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
7. Please explain you previous answer 
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12. During the objection(s) you were involved in, were you satisfied with the level of 
consideration given by the Independent Adjudicator given to information put forth by the 
fishery in question? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
13.  Please explain you previous answer 
 
14. In your opinion, who do you feel should pay for the costs of an MSC objection and why? 
 
15. Do you feel the costs of an objection may hinder the ability of stakeholders to object to a 
certification?  Please explain your answer  
 
16. How, in your opinion could the MSC objections process be improved (if at all)? 
 
17. Do you feel the MSC objections process supports its stated intent of providing “an orderly, 
structured, transparent and independent process by which objections to the Final Report and 
Determination of a certification body can be resolved”?  Please state and explain your 
reasons. 
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These accusations pose a real threat to the reputation of the MSC.   If left un-addressed, MSC’s 
credibility amongst consumers and academics has the potential to be lost.  This thesis seeks to 
investigate the legitimacy and robustness of the MSC OP.  There is a focus on the way in which the 
MSC OP facilitates interactions between objection actors, influences actors, and how each actor is 
empowered by the MSC OP methodology.   
 
 
2B. Independent Adjudicator 
 
1. As an Independent adjudicator for the MSC, are you satisfied with the parameters of your 
role in the MSC objections procedure? Please tick or highlight a box 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Not satisfied     □       Very un-satisfied   □ 
Other □ 
2. Please explain the reasons for your choice in question 1 
 
3. How satisfied are you with the MSC Objections procedure and how it operates?  
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Not satisfied     □       Very un-satisfied  □  
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
4. Please explain your previous answer 
 
5. As an Independent Adjudicator in the MSC objection process, do you feel you are able to 
weight evidence from all parties in a fair and transparent manner? Please explain you 
answer 
 
6. Do you feel there are any obstacles in the MSC objections procedure that inhibits your ability 
to make a fair, structured and independent ruling? Please elaborate on you answer 
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7a. What are, in your opinion the strengths and benefits of the MSC objections process? 
 
7b. What are, in your opinion the limitations of the MSC objections process? 
 
8. How, in your opinion do you feel the MSC objections process could be improved (if at all)? 
 
 
 
2C. Objector 
1. Which MSC objection(s) have you been involved in? 
 
2. Briefly summarise the primary concerns you and/or your associated organization raised 
during the objection process (if multiple objections have been lodged, please answer this 
and the following questions for each objection process you have been involved in 
 
3. How satisfied are you that the issues raised by yourself or your organisation were 
adequately addressed by the Certification Body? (Please tick a box, or replace the box with 
an x for electronic copy). 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □  Other  □ 
 
4. Please explain your previous answer 
 
5. If you are dissatisfied with how the Certifying Body addressed your issues during an 
objection, please state what you feel would need to have had occurred for you to consider 
the issues raised to have been adequately addressed. 
 
6. During each of the objections processes, how did you feel about the level of input and 
consideration given to the evidence and the arguments of the Certification Body and the 
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Applicant (i.e. the fishery applying for certification) (if relevant) by the Independent 
Adjudicator? Please select for each party. 
Applicant: 
 
 Excessive   □ Too much    □   About right    □ Too little     □    Much too little   □ N/A 
 □ 
Certification Body: 
Excessive   □ Too much    □   About right    □ Too little     □     Much too little   □ 
 
7. Please explain your ratings for the Applicant in the previous question  
 
8. Please explain your ratings for the Certification Body in the previous question 
 
9. Are you satisfied with the role that the Independent Adjudicator plays in the MSC objections 
process? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □    Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □  Other  □ 
 
10. Please explain your answer 
 
11. Who do you think should pay for the objections processes and why? 
 
12. Do you think the current financial charge to lodge an objection limits the ability of 
stakeholders to object? Please explain your answer 
 
13. In what ways do you think the MSC objections processes could be improved (if at all) and 
why? 
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14. Do you feel the MSC objections processes support its stated intent of providing “an orderly, 
structured, transparent and independent process by which objections to the Final Report and 
Determination of a certification body can be resolved”?  Please explain your reasons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2D. Fishery Client 
Interview Questionnaire: Certification Body (Individual) 
 
1. Please state which MSC objection(s) you have been involved in: 
 
2. Of the MSC objection(s) you have been involved with that have proceeded to full 
certification, have you been involved in a re-objection during re-certification? / 
 
3. Overall, how would you rate your experience with the MSC objection process? 
□ Very Good – I am very pleased with how the MSC objections process proceeded and 
feel it led to legitimate outcomes 
□ Good – Overall I am pleased with how the objections process proceeded.  I only 
harbour minor issues with the MSC objections process 
□ Neutral – I am neither pleased nor displeased with how the MSC objections 
procedure operates 
□ Mixed – I am pleased with certain elements of the MSC objections process, and 
displeased with others 
□ Bad – I am displeased with how the MSC objections process proceeds and feel it 
requires improvement 
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□ Very Bad – I believe the MSC objections process is flawed and leads to illegitimate 
outcomes 
4. Please elaborate on and explain your answer in the previous question  
 
5. During the MSC objection you have been involved with, were you satisfied with the role the 
Independent Adjudicator played? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Not satisfied     □       Very un-satisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
 
 
6. Please explain your previous answer 
 
7. When putting forth your arguments and evidence during the objections process, how would 
you rate the level of consideration given to your arguments and evidence by the 
Independent Adjudicator? 
□ Very Good – I am of the opinion that complete consideration was given to my 
arguments and evidence by the Independent Adjudicator within the parameters of 
the MSC objections procedure 
□ Good – I am of the opinion that consideration was given to the majority of my 
arguments and evidence by the Independent Adjudicator 
□ Neutral – I am of the opinion that the consideration given to my arguments and 
evidence by the Independent Adjudicator was neither good nor bad 
□ Mixed – There were incidents where I felt that more consideration could have been 
given to my evidence and arguments, but not all the time 
□ Bad – I am of the opinion that more consideration should have been given to my 
arguments and evidence by the Independent Adjudicator 
□ Very Bad – I am of the opinion that a lot more consideration could have been given 
to my arguments and evidence 
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8. Are you satisfied with the weighting given to your arguments and evidence by the 
Independent Adjudicator? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
9.  Please explain you previous answer    
 
10. During the objection(s) you were involved in, were you satisfied with the level of 
consideration the objecting body’s case was given by the Independent Adjudicator? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
11. Please explain you previous answer As explained before: we would have preferred the IA to 
take a closer look to the objection upon posting and acceptance by the IA.   
 
12. During the objection(s) you were involved in, were you satisfied with the level of 
consideration given by the Independent Adjudicator given to information put forth by the fishery in 
question? 
Very satisfied     □   Satisfied    □   Neutral    □ Unsatisfied     □       Very unsatisfied   □ 
Mixed (various points of view) □ 
 
13.  Please explain you previous answer 
 
15. In your opinion, who do you feel should pay for the costs of an MSC objection and why?  
 
15. Do you feel the costs of an objection may hinder the ability of stakeholders to object to a 
certification?  Please explain your answer   
 
16. How, in your opinion could the MSC objections process be improved (if at all)? 
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17. Do you feel the MSC objections process supports its stated intent of providing “an orderly, 
structured, transparent and independent process by which objections to the Final Report and 
Determination of a certification body can be resolved”?  Please state and explain your 
reasons.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Participant Information Sheet 
 
07/06/2011 
 
Participant Information Sheet for a Study of the MSC Objection Procedures 
 
Researcher: Joseph Edlin:  Masters student, School of Geography Environment and Earth Science, 
Victoria University of Wellington 
 
I am a Masters student in the Environmental Studies programme at Victoria University of 
Wellington. As part of this degree I am undertaking a research project leading to a thesis. The project 
I am undertaking is intended to examine the Marine Stewardship Council’s objections procedure, 
and how the MSC objections process facilitates interactions between actors, leading to the final 
ruling. The University requires that ethics approval be obtained for research involving human 
participants. 
 
I am inviting people who have been involved in the MSC objections process to participate in this 
study. Participants will be asked to complete an oral interview, an emailed questionnaire, or an 
online questionnaire.  This relates to your experiences during the objections procedures. The 
purpose is to gain an idea as to how the MSC objections processes have been perceived to operate 
by different actors.  
 
Questions are mainly open ended and you may be asked to answer further questions in order to 
clarify and expand on information gathered. If you can be clear and exact in your responses that 
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would help a lot. Should you feel the need to withdraw from the project, you may do so without 
question, however I would ask that you please do so by September 20, 2011 before the data is 
analysed. 
 
Responses collected will form the basis of my research project and will be put into a thesis which 
may also be published in part as academic and professional publications and presentations may be 
made to the scientific and professional and practice communities.  Any information you provide will 
not be attributed to you or your organisation, but it is acknowledged that those close to MSC and its 
processes may be able to discern the identity of contributors.  All raw data will be kept confidential. 
All interview transcripts, completed questionnaires and transcripts will be safely secured and no 
other person besides me and my supervisor, Cath Wallace, will see them and these will be used only 
for the purposes of this research.  At the end of two years after the publication of the research 
project outputs, all raw data will be destroyed. 
 
 
The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Geography Environment and Earth Sciences 
at Victoria University of Wellington and deposited in the University Library.   
 
 
4. Participant Consent Form 
 
 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
□ I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. 
 
□ I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have them answered to my satisfaction. 
 
□ I consent to information or opinions which I have given being used in any reports on this 
research. 
 
□  I am aware that all raw data I provide will be kept confidential and will not be attributed to 
me in any report on this research, though I understand that those familiar with MSC cases 
may be able to identify the sources of opinions on the MSC processes in any particular case. 
 
□ I understand that the raw data I provide will not be used for any other purpose than this 
research and reports on it or released to others except for my supervisor without my written 
consent. 
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□ I would like to receive a link to the results of this research when it is completed and the 
thesis has been accepted. 
 
□ I understand that I may withdraw any information provided by the 20th September 2011 
without question or consequence. 
 
□ I agree to take part in this research. 
 
□ I certify that I have the authority of my organisation……………………………………………………[insert 
name of organisation] to take part in this research. 
 
Signed: 
 
 
 
5. MSC Assessment Methodology (MSC, 2010b: 17-27) 
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6. MSC Objections Procedure Flow Diagram (MSC, 2009: C139) 
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7. MSC Objections Procedure Methodology (MSC, 2009b: 2-11) 
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